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WHAT IS THE LAW SPEAKING ABOUT when it speaks about religion? Religion

is very difcult to defne.1 Despite this, in the legal context, religion is
defned time and again, whether conceptually for legislative purposes (e.g.,
anti-discrimination legislation, charitable status) or concretely for adjudicative
purposes (e.g., a religious freedom claim, or another legal confict involving a
religious dimension). Te question that I explore in this article is how we should
approach—descriptively and critically—the way in which the law speaks about
religion in the context of litigation.2
I am not going to explore the defnition of “religion” as a category in law, such
as was ofered by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in the Syndicat Northcrest
v Amselem (“Amselem”) decision.3 Others have already addressed this, although
perhaps there is still room for more to be said.4 Rather, I will examine the process
by which the law apprehends religion in particular situations. Although the broad
defnition of religion used in the jurisprudence may overlap with the process of
apprehending religion in a particular case, my concern here is to understand and

1.
2.
3.

See e.g. Craig Martin, “Delimiting Religion” (2009) 12 Method & Teory in the Study
of Religion 157.
I qualify “law” here as the law of the state, not the concept of law more generally. Tis is an
important qualifcation because there are multiple modes of legality, including religious law,
which I am not discussing here.
2004 SCC 47 at para 39 [Amselem].
Defned broadly, religion typically involves a particular and comprehensive system of faith and
worship. Religion also tends to involve the belief in a divine, superhuman or controlling power.
In essence, religion is about freely and deeply held personal convictions or beliefs connected
to an individual’s spiritual faith and integrally linked to one’s self-defnition and spiritual
fulflment, the practices of which allow individuals to foster a connection with the divine or
with the subject or object of that spiritual faith.

4.

See e.g. Lori Beaman, “Defning Religion: Te Promise and the Peril of Legal Interpretation”
in Richard Moon, ed, Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (UBC Press, 2008) 192.
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articulate something about the process of apprehension itself.5 Looking closely at
this process has some important implications for the way that we describe and
critically respond to how religious claims are dealt with in a court of law.
It is almost trite to say that there is a gap between the law’s apprehension
of religion and the lived experience of religious groups. How the law describes
religion or frames a religious claim fails to capture the fullness of what is really
going on for those committed to a religion. Paying attention to lived religious
experience in analysing the law’s intersection with religion is part of a developing
cultural and phenomenological methodology. As Elizabeth Shakman Hurd
explained, “Te category of lived religion is meant to draw attention to the
practices that fall outside the confnes of religion as construed for purposes of
law and governance.”6 Likewise, Benjamin L. Berger has shown that the law’s
interactions with religion are based on a particular conception of what religion
is, fltered through the law’s own way of seeing the world.7 When the law
apprehends religion, religion is formatted to ft into the institutional, conceptual,
and functional structure of the law. Following a similar approach, Perry Dane
has suggested—I believe quite rightly—that the relationship between religion
and the state is best understood as an “existential encounter,” so that what is at
stake “is not merely a set of legal doctrines or policy prescriptions, but something
deeper and more constitutive.”8
Some scholars have described this gap in the law’s apprehension of religion
essentially as a misconception of religion.9 But, I believe that the situation is not
this simple. To see the law’s apprehension of religion as merely a misconception
presumes that there must be congruence between the internalities and externalities
of law (i.e., between law and religious experience). Congruence, however,
is elusive, and fails to consider the “deeper and more constitutive” forces at work
in the interaction between law and religion. Some studies, for example, have
traced the way in which the activity of the law impacts how religious individuals
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Te level of infuence and interdependence between broad conceptions of the category
“religion” and the process of law apprehending religion in specifc instances is an interesting
question but will be left for future investigation.
Beyond Religious Freedom: Te New Global Politics of Religion (Princeton University
Press, 2015) at 13.
Law’s Religion: Religious Diference and the Claims of Constitutionalism (University of Toronto
Press, 2015) at 147-48 [B Berger, Law’s Religion].
“Master Metaphors and Double-Coding” (2016) 53 San Diego L Rev 53 at 55.
See e.g. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Te Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton
University Press, 2005); Cécile Laborde, Liberalism’s Religion (Harvard University
Press, 2017), ch 1.
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and communities experience religious life—framing religious claims in legal
terms has a particular efect on religious self-understanding.10 Tis means that the
law’s conception of religion cannot be described merely as a misunderstanding or
a distorted understanding of religion; given the way that legal processes can afect
religious self-understanding, law is, in a peculiar and important way, constituting
lived religious experience.11 Te gap between the law’s apprehension of religion
and the lived experience of religion is not neat and tidy. Attending to the process
underlying the interaction between the two matters enormously. Tis is why
I speak in this article of the law’s “apprehension” of religion, which gestures
towards the active force of coming to know something through the socially rich
and integrative process of apperception.12
Peter L. Berger, in his classic work Te Sacred Canopy: Elements of a
Sociological Teory of Religion,13 described religion as an intricate part of the social
world which participates in an ongoing conversation with the various actors and
institutions within society.14 Social reality, from this view, is essentially dialectical,
which means that social ideas are constructed by people in a collective efort,
but those ideas, once constructed, also feedback to afect the way that people
understand the world. Social reality organizes, regulates, and gives meaning to
people’s lived experiences—in this way, society provides a world that is real. Te
dialectic of social reality involves the interaction between social institutions.
Religion and law, as two foundational social institutions, are engaged dialectically
in a conversation that creates and is created by the social world. Te multivalent
interaction between individual, institutional (and communal), and broader social
conceptions and meanings that produce the social world—social reality—is rich
10. See e.g. Howard Kislowicz, “Sacred Laws in Earthly Courts: Legal Pluralism in Canadian
Religious Freedom Litigation” (2013) 39 Queen’s LJ 175 (Kislowicz demonstrated the
infuence of state law norms on religious law norms—the state law process afects religious
self-perception (via description) of their obligations).
11. See generally Ananda Abeysekara, “Te Un-translatability of Religion, the Un-translatability
of Life: Tinking Talal Asad’s Tought Unthought in the Study of Religion” (2011) 23
Method & Teory in the Study of Religion 257.
12. See Alfred Schutz, “Symbol, Reality and Society” in Collected Papers I: Te Problem of
Social Reality (Martinus Nijhof, 1962) 287. Te notion of apperception is not discussed
in this paper, but rather is ofered here as a point of context for framing the thesis and
analysis of the paper.
13. (Anchor Books, 1967).
14. What follows in this paragraph is my own summary understanding of P Berger’s theory.
See especially ibid, ch 1, 2. For further elaboration of this social theory of knowledge, see
e.g. Peter L Berger & Tomas Luckmann, Te Social Construction of Reality: A Treaties in the
Sociology of Knowledge (Anchor Books, 1967). See also John R Searle, Te Construction of
Social Reality (Free Press, 1995).
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and complex. Te subject of this article is but one snippet of this grand social
interactive dialectic: I refer to this as the law’s apprehension of religion, as shown
particularly in the judicial context.
I use the term “apprehension” intentionally, to signal the process by which
something is incorporated into the conceptual framework of the law. Te law’s
apprehension of religion is, in many ways, paradigmatic of the way in which
the law relates to the world more generally. Everything that the law approaches
must be “apprehended” in legal terms and for legal purposes. In a general sense,
then, the law’s apprehension of religion is not unique. Te process of the law’s
apprehension of reality is ubiquitous. However, the particularities of religion
as a foundational social institution and symbolic form of meaning15 gives the
law’s apprehension of religion a peculiar prominence insofar as it provides a clear
image of the inner workings of the law and ofers great descriptive and critical
potential.16 At a basic conceptual level, the process of the law’s apprehension of
religion engages the “constitutional imagination”17 of our legal system.
How, then, are we to describe and evaluate the law’s apprehension of religion?
Benjamin Berger has argued that the law, like religion, is a culture bound by its
own unique symbolic, linguistic, aesthetic, and conceptual coordinates.18 From
this view, it is problematic when legal actors (and legal analysis) presume that
the law sits “above the fray” of culture (and its particular limitations).19 Tis
means that when we think about the law’s apprehension of religion we are not
dealing with an object or essence of “religion” that exists separately and apart
from the structuring power of the culture or discourse of law.20 In this way, the
law’s apprehension of religion points to a formative process, a socially constructed
15. See e.g. P Berger, supra note 13.
16. Similarly, see Benjamin L Berger, “Religious Freedom in Canada: A Crucible for
Constitutionalism” (2018) 1 Quaderni di Diritto e Politica Ecclesiastica 111 [B Berger,
“Religious Freedom”].
17. See Martin Loughlin, “Te Constitutional Imagination” (2015) 78 Mod L Rev 1 at 3, 12.
18. See B Berger, Law’s Religion, supra note 7 at 17.
19. Ibid at 12. B Berger’s argument echoes discourse theory insofar as in a discourse, the facts and
concepts in discussion are prefgured by the discourse itself; the discourse is the entire feld in
which facts become objects of analysis. See e.g. Tim Murphy, Representing Religion: Essays in
History, Teory and Crisis (Equinox, 2007) at 6. As Murphy states, “[d]iscourse is constitutive
not only of the domain which can treat as a possible object of (mental) perception. It is also
constitutive of the concepts it uses to identify the objects that inhabit that domain and to
characterize the kinds of relationships they can sustain with one another”) [emphasis in
original], citing Hayden White, Metahistory: Te Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century
Europe (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) at 31.
20. See also Abeysekara, supra note 11.
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reality, rather than to an abstract quality of “truth” that is either possessed or
lost. Ignorance of this, as we will see in the cases discussed later, skews our
understanding of and ability to critique the law. Concomitantly, legal actors
ought to be cautious (and humble) when approaching a religious claim, aware of
the cultural force of law.21
Placing the social-interactive process of apprehending religion in law at the
centre of our attention helps us think and talk diferently about religious claims
in law. We can see the law’s apprehension of religion as an expression of the social
and political values, and the functional purposes, that the law embodies. Tis
shifts our attention away from referring in law to external ideas about what is
‘true’ and ‘real’ religion, and towards refecting on the ways that the legal and
religious are knit together within the larger social world.
In this article, I argue that the law’s apprehension of religion can be thought
of in terms of legal fction. Legal fctions are not simply about treating facts
fctionally, “as if ” they were something other than they are, in order to solve
a legal problem. Although this is the basic form of a legal fction, it really is
only the tip of the iceberg. At the core, legal fctions are a mechanism of legal
reasoning that refects the central elements of social interaction, the dialectics of
social reality, and the like, as sketched out above. It is this process side of legal
fctions that I argue is most helpful for thinking and talking about the law’s
apprehension of religion.
Tis article’s analysis begins by examining the gap between the law’s
apprehension of religion and the lived experience of religion. Tis occurs
in two stages. First, I look at a concrete case that demonstrates the challenge
that the courts face when apprehending religion in law. Te case is Bentley v
Anglican Synod of the Diocese of New Westminster (“Bentley”).22 In this case, the
court addresses a dispute over Anglican church property that engages contrary
arguments about the true nature of Anglicanism. Tis case vividly portrays the
challenge that the courts face when they apprehend religion in law, and it sets the
course for the remaining analysis of the article. Second, I turn to the idea of legal
fction and argue that it can help us more fruitfully address the gap in the law’s
apprehension of religion. Legal fction frames the law’s apprehension of religion
not in terms of a rigid “true” or “false” correspondence between law and lived
religion but rather in terms of the purposes and goals of the law. Legal fction
also provides categorical limitations to the law’s apprehension of religion. A legal
21. For further discussion of the virtue of judicial humility, see B Berger, Law’s Religion, supra
note 7 at 170-77.
22. 2010 BCCA 506 [Bentley CA], af’g 2009 BCSC 1608 [Bentley SC (TD)].
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fction (such as the law’s apprehension of religion) does not operate in isolation
but involves a deep overlap and exchange with other forms of social meaning
(religion). Legal fction proves to be a very helpful tool for defning the terms of
engagement between the law’s apprehension of religion and the reality of lived
religion. It allows us to utilize the descriptive and critical analytic possibilities of
the social-interactive ideas mentioned above within a legal analysis of the law’s
interaction with religion.
In the second half of the article, I turn to use the lens of legal fction to
view and analyse the law’s apprehension of religion in three recent cases. First,
I return briefy to look at the Bentley decision, and refect on the application of
the discussion of legal fction to that case. I then look at the older Multani v
Commission Scolaire Maurgerite-Bourgeoys (“Multani”)23 decision, which shows
that the way the law apprehends religion involves a complex intersection between
diferent forms of meaning within the law. Finally, I turn to the recent Ktunaxa
Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations)
(“Ktunaxa Nation”)24 decision, which demonstrates a more abstract apprehension
of religion in law, and the efects of approaching religious and spiritual meaning
in a way that divides the subject and object of belief. Together these cases help
fesh out what it means to view the law’s apprehension of religion as a legal fction,
and they demonstrate the descriptive and critical possibilities of reframing the
law’s apprehension of religion in this way.

I. EXPLORING THE GAP IN THE LAW’S APPREHENSION
OF RELIGION
A.

BENTLEY—ANGLICANISM VS ANGLICANISM

Te Bentley case decided by the British Columbia Court of Appeal was about
a dispute over Anglican church property that centred around an ongoing
contestation within the global Anglican Communion. Cases like this often
produce discussions about the principles of state neutrality and religious
institutional autonomy.25 But for the purposes of my analysis, I am more
interested in the apparent gap that exists between the way that the BC Court of
Appeal apprehended the Anglican religion and the real lived experience of the
Anglican Communion. I argue that the Bentley decision brings into sharp relief
23. 2006 SCC 6, [Multani].
24. 2017 SCC 54 [Ktunaxa Nation SCC].
25. See e.g. Victor M Muniz-Fraticelli & Lawrence David, “Religious Institutionalism in a
Canadian Context” (2015) 52 Osgoode Hall LJ 1049; Laborde, supra note 9.
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the challenge, if not impossibility, of capturing the dynamism and complexity of
religious organization in legal terms.
By way of background, over the past 20 years there has been signifcant
discussion regarding the place of same-sex relationships within the global Anglican
Communion.26 Tese discussions relate to a much larger contestation within the
global Anglican Communion, which has complex historical, theological, and
political elements.27 Tis contest has created tensions and fssures within the global
Anglican Communion that some have described as a “crisis.”28 Tese tensions
have bubbled over in Canada, with a number of Anglican congregations breaking
away from the legally established and historically recognized hierarchical authority
structure of the Anglican Church of Canada (ACC) because of the controversial
theological and liturgical developments occurring within some ACC dioceses.29
26. Te question of the Church’s stance on same-sex unions was discussed during the Anglican
Communion’s 1998 Lambeth Conference. See Anglican Communion, “Te Lambeth
Conference Resolutions Archive from 1998” (9 August 1998), online (pdf ): <www.
anglicancommunion.org/media/76650/1998.pdf> [perma.cc/E3QS-ZSNV]. Te 1998
Lambeth Conference afrmed that same-sex couples should be cared for by the Church (ibid
at resolutions I.10c, d); the Church’s teaching on human sexuality and family relationships
should not be changed from its traditional understanding as monogamous and heterosexual
(ibid at resolution I.10b); and the blessing of same-sex unions should not be authorized (ibid
at resolution I.10e). Tere was deep disagreement over the issue of human sexuality at the
1998 Lambeth Conference. See Anglican Communion, “Called to Full Humanity - Section
1 Report: Subsection 3 - Human Sexuality” (1998), online: <www.anglicancommunion.org/
resources/document-library/lambeth-conference/1998/section-i-called-to-full-humanity/
section-i10-human-sexuality?author=Lambeth+Conference&year=1998> [perma.cc/
GC8C-XC82]. Te Lambeth Conference is the primary international gathering of Anglicans
in the global Church community and one of the four “Instruments of Communion” of
the Anglican Church. See Anglican Communion, “Instruments of Communion,” online:
<www.anglicancommunion.org/structures/instruments-of-communion.aspx> [perma.
cc/55C8-FSPK] [Anglican Communion, “Instruments of Communion”].
27. See Paula D Nesbitt, “Engaging Religion in a Contested Age: Contestations, Postmodernity,
and Social Change” (2020) 81 Sociology of Religion 142 at 147-51 (providing a summary
overview of the dispute).
28. Miranda K Hassett, Anglican Communion in Crisis: How Episcopal Dissidents and their African
Allies are Reshaping Anglicanism (Princeton University Press, 2007).
29. See e.g. Delicata v Incorporated Synod of the Diocese of Huron, 2013 ONCA 540, af’g
2011 ONSC 4403. Regarding the organization of the Anglican religion, see Anglican
Communion, “Structures,” online: <www.anglicancommunion.org/structures.aspx> [perma.
cc/YPE7-9PD4]; Te Anglican Church of Canada, “How We are Organized,” online:
<www.anglican.ca/about/organization> [perma.cc/7TW9-VZ5E]. Individual churches
form parishes, and parishes are subdivisions of a diocese. Dioceses are the fundamental
administrative unit of the Anglican Church. Bishops are the leaders of dioceses and
carry broad responsibility both locally (to appoint and oversee priests and their parishes)
and globally (to attend and participate in the Lambeth Conference, which is the regular
meeting of the Anglican Church). Dioceses are grouped into Provinces. Provinces and
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Te story leading up to the Bentley decision goes at least as far back as the
1998 Lambeth Conference (the primary gathering of the global community
of Anglicans that occurs every ten years), which had the question of same-sex
relationships within the Church on the agenda.30 At that time, the Conference
afrmed a conservative approach to same-sex relationships.31 As the situation
in some of the Canadian dioceses moved towards a progressive position, the
global Anglican Communion reafrmed the Resolutions of the 1998 Lambeth
Conference.32 Many of the global Anglican territories became frustrated with the
traditional leadership institutions in the Anglican Communion, including the
Archbishop of Canterbury, and their unwillingness (or inability) to address the
progressive developments happening in Canada and the United States. A large
portion of the global Anglican community responded with their feet, so to speak,
by creating the Global Anglican Future Conference (GAFCON), which met
in Jerusalem in 2008 as an alternative gathering to the Lambeth Conference
occurring at the same time.33 GAFCON settled on an Anglican confession that
clearly excluded the progressive developments in Canada and America.34
Tings came to a head in Canada in 2002 when Bishop Ingham of the diocese
of New Westminster in British Columbia decided to authorize the liturgical
blessing of same-sex relationships. A group of priests walked out of the New
Westminster diocesan meeting when the decision was reached, which signalled
the breaking apart of the diocese. Tis produced a furry of events that led to
the Bentley case.35 Te growing divide within the global Anglican Communion,
mentioned earlier, has led to the establishment of the Anglican Church in North

30.
31.
32.

33.
34.
35.

their leaders (usually called Archbishops) have various administrative roles in the global
Anglican Communion (including participating in the Primates Meeting and in the Anglican
Consultative Council). Provinces have some authority to regulate and guide the individual
bishops and dioceses within a designated territory, but the central units of administration are
the dioceses and their respective bishops.
See the Anglican Communion, “Instruments of Communion,” supra note 26.
See Bentley SC (TD), supra note 22 at para 67.
See e.g. Anglican Communion News Service, “A Statement by the Primates of the Anglican
Communion meeting in Lambeth Palace” (16 October 2003), online: <www.anglicannews.
org/news/2003/10/a-statement-by-the-primates-of-the-anglican-communion-meeting-inlambeth-palace.aspx> [perma.cc/75H2-664A].
See GAFCON, “About GAFCON,” online: <www.gafcon.org/about>
[perma.cc/U2L9-37LU].
GAFCON, “Te Complete Jerusalem Statement” (22 June 2008), online: <www.gafcon.org/
resources/the-complete-jerusalem-statement >; and GAFCON, “Te Jerusalem Declaration”
(29 June 2008), online: <www.gafcon.org/resources/the-jerusalem-declaration>.
For a description of the history of the dispute, see Bentley SC (TD), supra note 22
at paras 7-171.
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America (ACNA), which describes itself as a new “Province-in-formation” that
overlaps with the geographical territory of the ACC and the Episcopal Church of
America.36 Included in this Province is the Anglican Network in Canada (ANiC),
which purports to be a new diocese. Te four congregations represented in the
Bentley confict were some of the frst congregations to break away from the ACC
and constitute the ANiC.37
Te question for the Court in Bentley was whether the church property of
the congregations remained with the dioceses or should go with the individual
congregations breaking away from diocesan authority. At the heart of the dispute
were arguments about the foundation and organization of the Anglican religion,
which centred on the question of whether Anglicanism is grounded in doctrines
and a communal identity that transcends its local organizational structure. Te
disagreement over the nature of Anglicanism shaped the legal arguments used
and the decisions of courts. In other words, at the heart of the Bentley decision is
the law’s apprehension of the Anglican religion.
Te idea of Anglicanism relied on by the plaintif congregations led them
to frame their argument in terms of trust law. Tey claimed that the church
property was held in trust for the purposes of Anglican ministry, not simply at the
discretion of the bishops.38 For the plaintifs, the reference to “Anglican ministry”
in the founding documents of the ACC referred to a history and community that
transcended the geographical territory of the particular bishops and the Province
of the ACC. For the defendant diocese to digress from the global Anglican
perspective on same-sex relationships, the plaintifs argued, was a breach in its
trust obligation to remain faithful to Anglicanism. Te property should therefore
follow the congregations in order to preserve its use in accordance with historical
and global Anglicanism.
Te defendant diocese argued that the clarity of incorporation and
organizational structure of the Anglican churches and dioceses in Canada
provided sufcient basis to determine the ownership and use of Church
property.39 According to them, the organizational documents spelled out a
well-defned hierarchical and territory-based system of authority tied primarily
to the dioceses and secondarily to a national association. As such, the theological
36. For an outline of the history leading to the creation of the ACNA Province and the ANiC
diocese, see Anglican Network in Canada, “Realignment in the Communion: A Canadian
Chronology,” online: <www.anglicannetwork.ca/our-genesis> [perma.cc/SUQ3-ZLVD].
37. See Bentley SC (TD), supra note 22 at paras 1-6.
38. Ibid at para 172f.
39. Ibid at paras 211f.
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and communal aspects of Anglicanism referred to by the plaintifs were in fact
embedded within organizational structures of the local diocese and the ACC.
Te internal processes of this organizational structure allowed for the progressive
development of the diocese objected to by the plaintifs. Hence, the property
should remain within the diocese.
Te decisions of the courts, both at trial and on appeal, sided with the diocese
and refused the claim of the departing congregations to excise and bring the
property with them. Te courts adopted a view of Anglicanism that focused on
the integrity of the local organization of the Anglican Church rather than on the
international and abstract dimension of the Anglican Communion.40 Te Court
of Appeal found that the parish properties were indeed being held in trust “for the
purpose of Anglican Ministry”41 but agreed with the trial decision that the highly
structured nature of the ACC distinguished this case from other cases involving
trusts and the use of religious property.42 Te Court did not think that “Anglican
worship” or “Anglicanism” could be separated from the notion of the episcopal
authority of the ACC, and found that Anglicanism is quintessentially hierarchical
and operates generally independent of the global Anglican Communion.43 Te
formalized authority of the hierarchy of the Anglican Communion appears only
within the diferent Provinces (of the church) and their dioceses. Tis means
that the participation of the ACC in the global Anglican Communion does not
depend on a structure of authority standing above the ACC. Te ACC (and its
constituent dioceses) is ultimately autonomous and entitled to decide for itself
whether to approve same-sex blessings and risk causing schisms in the global
Anglican Communion.44
Te Court of Appeal went on to adopt a territorial understanding of the
Anglican Church structure, and found that it was antithetical to consider
Anglican ministry in Canada in a congregation that has withdrawn from the
authority of its diocese and bishop.45 Te Court admitted the possibility that the
plaintif congregations might indeed be in communion with the global Anglican
Church, but did not presume to have the ability to speak to this.46 Rather, the
Court held that “Anglican ministry in Canada” meant “as defned by the ACC.”47
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See ibid at para 256; Bentley CA, supra note 22 at para 74.
Bentley CA, supra note 22 at para 65.
Ibid at para 69.
Ibid at para 74.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 75.
Ibid at para 76.
Ibid at para 74.
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Interfering with this clearly established territorial governance by bishops would
inject uncertainty in the internal afairs of the ACC and likely produce more
confict than it would resolve. Te Court specifcally said that the law should not
be used to permit the continuance of Anglican congregations that have removed
themselves from the authority of a geographically established bishop in favour of
the authority of a foreign bishop, because to do so would be unprecedented and
(presumably) disruptive.48
Te Court of Appeal framed the challenge of its judgment as trying to bring
“two ships passing in the night” within speaking distance of each other.49 Tis
statement was intended to refect the distance between the parties. But I think it
applies just as well to the gap between the Court’s approach to the case and the
lived experience of Anglican communities in Canada and elsewhere. It is true
that in order to decide the legal question at issue in Bentley, it was necessary for
the Court to adopt some basic premises about the nature of Anglicanism. Tis
task proved to be quite challenging. How was the court to ft the square peg of an
abstract universal notion of Anglicanism (claimed by the plaintifs) into the round
hole of the clearly defned organizational instruments and authority structures of
Anglicanism that exist in Canadian law (emphasized by the defendant)? But the
challenge actually involved something more than that. How could the courts
give a full account of the larger dispute of the global Anglican Communion in
its decision on the individual Bentley case? To use an analogy, how could the
courts relate its examination of a small cross-sectional tissue sample to the living
organism from which it was taken?
Te challenge, and perhaps impossibility, of the task faced by the courts
becomes clearer in light of how the confict in the Anglican Communion has
evolved following the Bentley decision. As time has passed, the fracturing apart
of the global Anglican Communion has become more and more apparent.
GAFCON has become increasingly successful in calling for a disciplinary response
to certain progressive liturgical innovations. For example, in 2016, the Episcopal
Church of America was suspended for a period of three years from participating
in various aspects of the international Anglican Communion;50 likewise, in 2017,
48. Ibid at para 75.
49. Ibid at paras 52, 61.
50. Anglican Communion, “Walking Together in the Service of God in the World”
(11-15 January 2016), online (pdf ): <www.anglicancommunion.org/media/206035/
Communiqu%C3%A9_from_the_Primates_Meeting_2016.pdf> [perma.cc/DT6B-QTEM].
As an aside, it is not clear what follows after the 3-year suspension because the Primates did
not convene for a formal meeting in 2019, and might not meet for a longer period of time
due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

MAJOR, THE LAW’S APPREHENSION OF RELIGION AS A LEGAL FICTION 779

the Scottish Episcopal Church was also suspended.51 Te same may eventually
happen to the ACC, as it continues to support liberal interpretations and practices
regarding marriage.52 Te alienation of the Episcopal Church of America, the
Scottish Episcopal Church, and the possibility of the same happening to the
ACC, undermine an important aspect of both the trial and appellate court
decisions in Bentley. Te trial court noted and relied on the fact that the ACC
was still fully active within the global Anglican Communion.53 Witnessing the
growing fssure (albeit very gradual and slow) between the ACC and the global
Anglican Communion indicates that perhaps the plaintifs were correct to say
that the ACC is out of step with “Anglican ministry.”
A similar point may be made regarding the Court of Appeal’s focus on
the fact that the Anglican Church in Canada is fundamentally a “government
by bishops.”54 Te Court of Appeal relied on the clearly defned geographical
and hierarchical authority structure of the ACC.55 Although the ACC sends
its bishops to participate in activities of the global Anglican Communion, the
Court of Appeal did not think this meant that the ACC is beholden to any
authority other than its own local diocesan governmental organization. Te
question, then, is whether the growing recognition of the ANiC and the ACNA
in the global Anglican Communion jeopardizes the Court of Appeal’s conclusion
that “[i]t is antithetical to the nature of Anglicanism to contemplate ‘Anglican
51. Anglican Communion, “God’s Church for God’s World” (6 October 2017), online (pdf ):
<www.anglicancommunion.org/media/311326/communiqué-primates-meeting-2017.pdf>
[perma.cc/GYR4-NUUB] [Anglican Communion, “God’s Church”].
52. Recently there was an efort to amend the ACC Canon law defnition of marriage to
include same-sex unions. A motion to this efect was passed at the General Synod of
the ACC in 2016. See Anglican Church of Canada, “General Synod 2016 Resolution
A051-R2: Amendment to Canon XXI (On Marriage in the Church)” (July 2016), online
(pdf ): <www.anglican.ca/wp-content/uploads/a051-R2.pdf> [perma.cc/549A-HYX4].
Te resolution required a second reading and vote at the next General Synod in 2019.
Te resolution was ultimately defeated at the 2019 General Synod, narrowly falling short
of the 2/3 majority support needed to pass. See Anglican Church of Canada, “General
Synod Resolution A052-R2: Motion for a Second Reading of Amendment to Canon XXI
(On Marriage in the Church)” (2019), online (pdf ): <gs2019.anglican.ca/wp-content/
uploads/A052-R2-vote-results.pdf> [perma.cc/SZR5-DUQB]. Te Bishops of the ACC
issued a media statement afrming the shared commitment to allow individual dioceses and
jurisdictions to continue celebrating same-sex marriage according to their own contexts and
convictions. See Anglican Church of Canada, “A Message from the House of Bishops of the
Anglican Church of Canada to General Synod 2019” (2019), online: <gs2019.anglican.ca/
atsynod/a-message-from-hob> [perma.cc/27VH-QHS2].
53. See Bentley SC (TD), supra note 22 at para 260.
54. Bentley CA, supra note 22 at para 76.
55. Ibid at para 74.
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ministry’ in a parish that has withdrawn from the authority of its diocese and
bishop.”56 Tis geographically-based view of Anglican territorial jurisdictions
clearly has resonance within the Anglican tradition.57 However, ANiC and
ACNA currently operate geographically parallel to the diocese and provinces of
the ACC. It is possible that they will never be fully accepted in the Anglican
Communion,58 but their recognition among the popular majority of the global
Anglican Communion (in GAFCON) suggests that the territorial exclusivity of
the “government of bishops” may not be quintessentially Anglican after all.
Having said all of this, it is not clear what legal efect should be given to
these broad developments within the global Anglican Communion. Tere were
compelling reasons for the courts to focus their analyses on the local level. Te
properties in question had concrete physical locations, which were registered
locally. Tis frames the legal analysis quite naturally within the locally enacted
structures of the Anglican Church of Canada—i.e., in the hands of the local
bishop. Although the use of local property could be directed by a source external
to the local territory, in order for that to happen, it is necessary for the link between
the local property and the foreign directorship to be clear and unambiguous. Tis
is precisely where the Court of Appeal sided with the ACC. Te documents and
instruments available to the Court for defning the ownership and use of the
property provided a link between the property, the individual congregations, and
the local bishop. Te local diocese was connected through its own governing
documents with the national association of the ACC. Tat, however, is where the
linkage ended. Te Court of Appeal found that the connection between the local
property of the congregation and the historical and global Anglican Communion
referenced by the plaintifs was not strong enough to supplant the well-defned
authority of the local bishop.
Te Court of Appeal’s perspective has support from within the global
Anglican Communion itself. Te then Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan
Williams, said that there is no central authority for settling disputes within the
Anglican Communion. Even the joint perspective of church leaders does not
constitute a “supreme court”; the “communion” of the Church is rooted more in

56. Ibid at para 75.
57. For a discussion on the importance of respecting territorial integrity with “consent and
courtesy,” and avoiding “cross-border interventions”, see Anglican Communion, “God’s
Church,” supra note 51.
58. ACNA is not recognized as a Province in the Anglican Communion. See ibid.
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joint action than doctrine.59 It might well have been reasonable for the courts to
take the position that their role is not to sort out the church’s self-identity question,
but to decipher the most practicable identity of the church for the purposes of
applying Canadian law (i.e., managing the property rights at stake in the case).
On the other hand, although there is no centralized mechanism for discipline,
there is an undeniable sense that the global Anglican Communion is a unity. Te
actions of each part afect the others. Tis has generated an unmistakable will of
the Communion to press through diferences and disagreements to continue to
walk together.60
What, then, are we to do with the courts’ apprehension of Anglicanism?
It clearly does not refect the complexity of the lived reality of religion for
Anglicans at either the local or the global level. Does it matter that Anglicanism
was portrayed by the courts in a state much frmer than the lived experience of
the Anglican Communion might allow? It would perhaps be irrational to expect
that the view of Anglicanism employed by the courts could adequately capture
the full dynamism and complexity of an international and ancient organization
like the Anglican Church. After all, “Legal analysis depends on the fattening of
complexity, on the selection of material dimensions of experience and the deemed
irrelevance of others.”61 Despite any of its analytic strengths or weaknesses, the
Bentley decisions clearly show the persisting tension between the law’s conception
of religion and the dynamic and evolving world of religious life.
Te important point to take from Bentley is not as prosaic as to say that there
may be no fnal solution to the challenges presented by the law’s apprehension
of religion. Instead, it calls for a renewed way of thinking and talking about the
process by which the apprehension occurs, which would consider and respond
appropriately to the challenges and complexities involved. Te descriptive and
critical possibilities made available through the notion of legal fction, which I

59. “Archbishop of Canterbury’s statement at the fnal press conference of the Primates’ Meeting”
Anglican Communion News Service (16 October 2003), online: <www.anglicannews.org/
news/2003/10/archbishop-of-canterburys-statement-at-the-fnal-press-conference-of-theprimates-meeting.aspx> [perma.cc/MD7M-D54M].
60. “Archbishop Welby briefs ACC members on the Primates’ gathering and meeting” Anglican
Communion News Service (8 April 2016), online: <www.anglicannews.org/news/2016/04/
archbishop-welby-briefs-acc-members-on-the-primates-gathering-and-meeting.aspx>
[perma.cc/MKN5-HEYV].
61. B Berger, Law’s Religion, supra note 7 at 26. In the same place Berger referred to Bruno
Latour’s memorable idea that trying to access the world through law is like “trying to fax
a pizza.” Bruno Latour, Te Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d’Etat (Polity
Press, 2010) 268.
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will turn to in the next section of the article, provide a way to step forward in
this direction.

II. LEGAL FICTION—FRAMING THE PROCESS AND
LIMITATIONS OF LAW’S APPREHENSION OF RELIGION
Given the gap between lived religion and the law’s apprehension of religion,
legal fction presents itself as a way to view the intersection between law and
religion. But what it means to call law’s apprehension of religion a legal fction
is not self-evident and requires investigation and explanation. Te idea of legal
fction is somewhat contentious in the academic literature.62Although there is
some general agreement about the key elements of a legal fction, and there is a
growing sense of agreement about the meaning of those elements, there is not as
clear of a consensus regarding the function and utility of legal fctions. In spite
of this, the emerging notion of legal fction is very helpful for understanding the
law’s apprehension of religion.
Lon Fuller ofered the following defnition of legal fctions, which refects
a commonly held view of some of their key elements “A fction is either (1)
a statement propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its falsity,
or (2) a false statement recognized as having utility.”63 Tere are variations of
this defnition, but its core elements have remained generally intact. Pierre J.J.
Olivier, for example, suggested that Fuller’s defnition, along with the other
Anglo-American writers on the topic (like Jeremy Bentham, Sir Henry Maine
and Jerome Frank), did not add anything unique to the earlier ideas of the Roman
“Commentators” of the fourteenth and ffteenth centuries and the continental
tradition.64 Olivier’s defnition of legal fction, which he developed from a broad
analysis of the history of the idea, does not difer signifcantly from Fuller’s, except
to further restrict the scope of its application: “Under legal fction, I understand
an assumption of fact deliberately, lawfully and irrebuttably made contrary to
the facts proven or provable in a particular case, with the object of bringing a
particular legal rule into operation or explaining a legal rule, the assumption

62. A thorough discussion of legal fctions from multiple perspectives can be found in
Maksymilian Del Mar & William Twinning, eds, Legal Fictions in Teory and Practice
(Springer, 2015).
63. Lon L Fuller, Legal Fictions (Stanford University Press, 1967) at 9.
64. Legal Fictions in Practice and Legal Science (Rotterdam University Press, 1975) at 36-37.
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being permitted by law or employed in legal science.”65 Or, in other words, a legal
fction treats something “as if ” it is something else for the purposes of law.
Taking this defnition of legal fctions as a starting point, I argue that there
are three elements central to the idea of legal fction, which are particularly useful
for helping us think about the law’s apprehension of religion: (1) legal fctions
are functional conceptions of things developed by the law specifcally to enable
the law to achieve its purposes and goals; (2) legal fctions are socially interactive
because they typically arise in relation to diferent conceptions of things as
developed in other social institutions; (3) legal fctions are limited insofar as they
must not be confused with the objective reality of things, and they must remain
aware and respectful of other conceptions external to law as well as the processes
by which these external conceptions are created.
Tese elements of legal fction provide a unique vantage point for
understanding and evaluating the law’s apprehension of religion.66 Tey allow us
to take seriously the idea that law has a special role in constructing religion within
the legal context, while also recognizing the complex interaction between the
legal conception of religion and the external reality of lived religious experience.
As Lon Fuller noted, “Te fction…forces upon our attention the relation
between theory and fact, between concept and reality, and reminds us of the
complexity of that relation.”67
In what follows I will elaborate on two implications of viewing the law’s
apprehension of religion as a legal fction, which fow from these elements of
legal fctions. First, I describe the way that legal fctions are a socially constructive
tool that operate where diferent views of reality and systems of meaning cross
over each other. From this view, the gap between the law’s apprehension of
religion and lived religion is not a divergence from “fact”—in that it is either
true or false—but rather is a social institutional construction meant to achieve
a specifc purpose. Likewise, legal fctions point us towards the importance of
community and the relationship between communities in the law’s apprehension
of religion. Secondly, I sketch some of the conceptual limitations of legal fctions
in relation to other constructions of meaning. Legal fctions are an instance of a
foundational process of creating social knowledge and meaning, which I describe
65. Ibid at 81.
66. A brief note of clarifcation. I am not arguing that law should be thought of as a fction,
although I do fnd the idea plausible and full of theoretical potential. Te use of legal fction
here is more circumscribed, ofering a diferent point of view from which to refect on the
gap between law and religion.
67. Fuller, supra note 64 at ix.
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as a social-symbolic process. I argue that this reveals an ethical dimension to the
legal fction of law’s apprehension of religion.
In terms of the function of legal fctions within the law, legal fctions are
sometimes portrayed as unnecessary and problematic for the function of law.
Jeremy Bentham’s disdain for legal fctions is famous. He went so far as to claim,
“It has never been employed but to a bad purpose…It has never been employed
but with a bad efect.”68 For those less negative, fctions might serve a purpose,
although only for a short time. Tey occupy a very small part of the territory of
legal reasoning, representing the limitations of human language and reasoning
in building clear and distinct laws—either of defciency in terms of the purpose
of the law or in terms of the language of everyday experience.69 Legal fctions are
eventually, and as a matter of course, outgrown and fall out of use.70
Others claim that legal fctions are a central part of the epistemological
structure of law, which is to say that they are not an historical remnant or a
transitory tool but central to the function of law and legal reasoning.71 Tis is not
to say that particular legal fctions are permanent, but rather that the cycle of the
formation and passing of legal fctions refects a central part of law.72 A popular
68. John Bowring, ed, Te Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol 9 (William Tait, 1843) at 77. In this
same chapter Bentham rattled of such a series of harsh criticisms against legal fctions that
it was difcult to pick which one to include. Te substance of his objection to legal fctions
is that they fy in the face of utilitarian reasoning, and hence can (and only ever are) used to
perpetuate a situation of social organization and distribution of advantages, which supports
the few at the expense of the many. See ibid at 78 (representing this sentiment in the
statement that legal fctions enable “[government functionaries] with the greater efciency
and to the greater extent, to make sacrifce of the universal interest to their several particular
and sinister interests”).
69. See Olivier, supra note 64 at 109-10.
70. See e.g. Fuller, supra note 63 at 70, 117-18; Olivier, supra note 64 at 108.
71. See e.g. Geofrey Samuel, “Is Law a Fiction?” in Del Mar & Twinning, supra note 62,
31 at 51. As Samuel notes, “[t]he theorist provides a fctional (‘as if ’) model for the judges
within which the judges employ fctional (‘as if ’) images to relate law to social fact, this social
fact itself resulting from an ‘as if ’ construction operating both within and without the facts.”
Also see Frederick Schauer, “Legal Fictions Revisited” in Del Mar & Twinning, supra note
62, 113 at 126. For Schauer, “[t]he examination of legal fctions, therefore, is not simply an
examination of an epiphenomenal and quaint feature of legal reasoning. Rather, it is an entry
into the difcult problem of legal truth.”
72. See e.g. RA Samek, “Fictions and the Law” (1981) 31 UTLJ 290, in which the author argues
that the temporariness of the legal fction—the constant birth and death of legal fctions—is
a part of a cycle of meaning formation that is central to the law. For Samek, “[t]he birth of
a fction inevitably leads to its death. A new dogma replaces the old, and the whole process
starts all over again….Te stability of law is an illusion, and so is the lawyers’ fxed belief that
it can be reformed from within. Law, like the fctions which it employs, is a means to a social
end, not an end in itself ” (at 317).
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idea along these lines is that the legal fction is a mechanism for the evolution
of the law as legal institutions and principles encounter and respond to new
situations. Legal fctions have been described as a way for judges to creatively
probe possibilities for the future development of the law by artifcially extending
a legal rule to encourage refection on the possibility of a more permanent
solution.73 A fction might be used as a tool of equity, to help soften what would
be the otherwise harsh result of applying a legal rule.74 A legal fction might also
be used as a way of incorporating a new reality into the existing legal system (for
example, the fction that a ship is a person).75
Te most compelling account of legal fction, in my view, was provided by
Lon Fuller, who shows how legal fctions operate as a pragmatic tool central to
the evolution of the law, necessitated by the confuence of the limitations and the
universal aspirations of law. Tey arise in order to reconcile a specifc legal result
with some premise or postulate about the law.76 Law is a comprehensive system
that cannot simply allow gaps to exist in its structure or to admit that some things
are outside of its reach.77 But the law is constantly confronting a world that is
diferent, and legal fctions arise as the law adapts itself to this external reality.
Fictions are like “the cement that is always at hand to plaster together the weak
spots in our intellectual structure.”78 In other words, “fctions are, to a certain
extent, simply the growing pains of the language of the law.”79 Trough legal
fctions the law asserts its structure over an unruly world, providing an alternate
form of reality through which the law is able to address the world.
Fuller’s analysis of legal fctions helps us to understand that the gap between
the law’s apprehension of religion and the lived reality of religion refects a more
pervasive struggle between the concepts/theory of law and the reality/facts
external to law.80 From this point of view, the gap between law’s apprehension of
religion and lived religion is both a problem and a foundational feature of legal
meaning. Fuller argued that the law’s fctions are not a “counterfeit of external

73. See Maksymilian Del Mar, “Legal Fictions and Legal Change” (2013) 9 Int’l J Law
in Context 442.
74. See e.g. Douglas Lind, “Te Pragmatic Value of Legal Fictions” in Del Mar & Twinning,
supra note 62, 83 at 102-03 (discussing the example of constructive eviction).
75. See ibid at 95-96.
76. Fuller, supra note 63 at 51.
77. Ibid at x-xi.
78. Ibid at 52.
79. Ibid at 21-22.
80. Ibid at xi.
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reality” but rather “an instrument which enables us to orient ourselves in this
world of reality.”81
Fuller’s idea of legal fction is emulated in the law’s apprehension of religion.
As noted in the Bentley case, there is a persistent gap between lived religion and
the law’s apprehension of religion. By positing a particular view of religion in law,
the law is enabled to act in relation to religion. But Fuller noted that “[a] formal
rule, no matter how frmly rooted its foundations may be in reality, tends to
gather about itself a force not entirely justifed by its foundations. It crystallizes
and formalizes the truth it expresses.”82 For this reason, Fuller argued that fctions
must be treated with a certain tepidity. He went so far as to say that they must
ultimately “drop out of the fnal reckoning” because “[w]e must not suppose that
the “thing” [the fction] is something more than the sum-total of its properties.”83
Te challenge of making sense of the gap in the law’s apprehension of religion
may be tied to some potential misunderstandings about the nature and value of
fctions and their relation to truth. Not everyone agrees that legal fctions are
necessarily false, and there are many diferent views regarding what the falsity of
a fction entails.84 Problems arise when we take the law’s fction and treat it as if
it is the only reality, when fctions gain a gravity and sense of reality beyond the
limited scope for which they were created and utilized. Fuller’s account of legal
fction underscores that law’s apprehension of religion is false in a very specifc
sense of falsity.
One way to think about this is in terms of the distinction between a
fction and a metaphor. A metaphor is an attempt to express the true qualities
of an object by equating it to something that symbolizes those qualities.85 Te
diference is between ontological reality and social reality. A metaphor (like other
81.
82.
83.
84.

Ibid at 105.
Ibid at 46.
Ibid at 117.
See e.g. Karen Petroski, “Legal Fictions and the Limits of Legal Language” (2013) 9 Intl
J Law in Context 485 (reprinted in Del Mar & Twinning, supra note 62, 131); Kenneth
Campbell, “Fuller on Legal Fictions” (1983) 2 Law & Phil 339. Te notion of falsity has
great potential for defning and delimiting the idea and use of legal fctions. See e.g. Olivier,
supra note 64 for an extensive discussion of what constitutes a legal fction.
85. Olivier, supra note 64 at 67. Tere is, though, ambiguity regarding what counts as
“qualities,” and how they are identifed. For example, rather than seeing the physical trait
of live birth as the attributed “quality,” it could instead be understood to be an object
that symbolizes the quality of holding a legal right (like the stone symbolizes hardness,
coldness, et cetera.). In this way the legal fction “the unborn child was born alive” is no
diferent than the example of the metaphor “she has a heart of stone.” Olivier discusses both
examples, ibid at 65-68.
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abstract legal notions) makes a statement about the reality of the object, whereas
a legal fction makes a statement about the object in relation to its treatment at
law, a social institution. But, if the social facts of law are considered to be real,
even in a sense diferent than physical ontology,86 then the legal fction could be
understood as an attempt to make a truthful description of the object within the
reality of law.
Legal fctions need only be false in a more general sense if one form of reality
is privileged over others. Tis view of fctions has been taken up by other scholars.
Kenneth Campbell, for example, challenged the idea that legal fctions are false,
arguing that fction is based on diferent classifcations of fact rather than on
an objective notion of truth.87 In a similar vein, Karen Petroski argued that it
is problematic to juxtapose fction with a presumed other “reality” to which the
law must conform.88 For her, the law creates its own reality, and in this way it
should not be treated as false. Te reality of law must be recognized and wrestled
with in its complexity. Holding fast to the idea that legal fctions are false in
a more general sense renders the nature of the reality of law more difcult to
ascertain. If law is real and has real efects on people’s lives, then legal fctions
cannot depend on factual falsity because that would mean they are not “real.”
Tis helps to make sense of the gap between law’s apprehension of religion
and the reality of lived religion. If the law’s constructions must be true, both in
relation to law’s own purposes as well as in relation to an independent factual
reality, then squaring these two forms of reality becomes very difcult. It is better
to recognize that legal fctions, including the law’s apprehension of religion,
like other legal structures, help to constitute the reality of law. Recognizing this
connection between legal fction and the construction of law’s reality explains the
importance of insisting on the limitations of legal fctions. As Nancy J. Knauer
noted, “[A] fction can…become dangerous when the force of its constitutive
power is ignored. When this occurs, the label of fction works a denial and
removes from memory important lessons regarding the law and the fragility
of the human experience.”89 Legal fctions must therefore always be framed in
relation to the limited reality of the law.

86. See Searle, supra note 14.
87. Supra note 84.
88. Supra note 84. Others making a similar argument against the privileging of one form of
reality include Samek, supra note 72, and Lind, supra note 74.
89. “Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth” (2010) 23 St Tomas L Rev 1 at 8.
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Truth and falsity of legal fctions are related to the function of legal fctions
within the law.90 Douglas Lind described this as a pragmatic approach to truth and
reality.91 Simply stated, for a fction to be true and real it must work satisfactorily
for us.92 Pragmatic value, for Lind, is given by us to our raw experiences (to
the world as we fnd it) in light of the problems, interests, and purposes that
we have in mind.93 Legal fctions, such as the law’s apprehension of religion,
are evaluated in terms of the pragmatic value they provide specifc to our legal
interests, purposes, and goods. In other words, they are socially constructed
through the life of a legal community. As a result, the truth and reality of legal
representations are constantly in fux. Even though they are tied to our actual
experiences they never reach a point of absoluteness or fnality. Tey are always
being built upon. Te virtue of fctions is their humility and tentativeness; they
do not take themselves to be settled or immovable.94
In this way, legal fctions remind us about the tentative nature of law in its
relation to religion.95 Law creates its own fctional image of religion. Te gap
between this fction and other accounts of the reality of religion are not a matter
of truth or falsity, in an objective sense, but refect the purposes of the reality
of law. Tis gap is not a matter of truth or falsity because the law’s reality is not
necessarily meant to be a true refection of external reality, but rather is guided by
its own ends and purposes.
Te idea that the “‘truth” of a fction is grounded in the reality and purposes
of the law must be qualifed, however. Te truth and value of a fction is not
entirely distinct from the world existing separately from the social reality of law.
Tere must be a connection—and a tension—between the legal understanding of
what is true and real and the ordinary, or external, ideas of what is true and real,
or else the law would be rendered incapable of infuencing and guiding people’s
behaviour.96 As Schauer explained:
Legal fctions are thus parasitic on a gap between legal language and all-thingsconsidered sound results. Without this gap we would be unable to understand
the idea of a legal rule, and unable to understand the way in which law, however
technical at times it might get, must remain tethered to the language in which it
is written, and thus tethered to the language of the linguistic community in which
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Lind, supra note 74 at 99.
Ibid at 84.
Ibid at 89-90.
Ibid at 90.
Samek, supra note 72 at 313-14.
Ibid at 317.
Schauer, supra note 71 at 126.
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the legal system exists. Were it otherwise, there would be no need for law. More
importantly, were it otherwise, there would be no legal truth, no legal falsity, and,
quite simply, no possibility of law at all.97

Tis points to another important dimension of viewing the law’s apprehension
of religion as a form of legal fction, which is that it reframes the law’s encounter
with religion as a criss-cross of realities.98 What makes a legal fction fctional is
not its relation to the truth, but the fact that the “truth” of the fction claimed
within the law collides and conficts with the “truth” claimed somewhere outside
of the law. More precisely, a legal fction is a legal proposition that collides with an
alternate proposition from another system of meaning—it is a collision between
systems of meaning.99 What is at issue is not the objective true or real meaning of
a thing, like a religious belief or experience, but the interaction between diferent
ideas about the meaning of the thing.
In other words, legal fctions are not unconstrained. Te emphasis that I have
placed on the purposes and reality of the law as the basis for the law’s apprehension
of religion does not mean that the law can conceptualize religion in any way
it likes. Te gap between the law’s apprehension of religion and the external
experience of religion cannot be framed in terms of truthful correspondence,
but rather must be seen in terms of the interaction between the law’s reality and
religious reality. Te gap is an expression of this interaction. Although the value
of the law’s apprehension of religion is not fully determined by its correspondence
with the “reality” of religion, it is still tied to that external reality.
Tis is particularly salient to the law’s apprehension of religion, given the
inherent difculty in defning religion, both as a conceptual category and in terms
of the core elements of a specifc belief, practice, or venerated object.100 Religion
is less an objective thing than it is a form of individual and communal meaning
bound up in the life of a tradition. When law apprehends religion, it grapples
with ideas and forms of meaning that are grounded in a distinct social reality.
As we will see later in the discussions of the Ktunaxa and Multani cases, religious
objects and ideas cannot be separated from their religious traditions. To do so fails
to grapple with the fact that legal fctions are a part of the social reality of law that
97.
98.
99.
100.

Ibid at 127.
See Lind, supra note 74 at 97, 99.
Ibid at 94.
See, e.g. Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity
and Islam (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993) at 29. As Asad notes, “[t]here cannot be
a universal defnition of religion, not only because its constituent elements and relationships
are historically specifc, but because that defnition is itself the historical product of
discursive process.”
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overlaps with the social reality of religion. Te problems that arise when treating
religious objects and ideas in terms other than as elements of religious tradition
are numerous, some of which will be elaborated upon below. Te point that I
would like to emphasize here is that to do so is a fundamental misunderstanding
of the process by which law apprehends religion—the emerging legal fction
interweaves with the religious form of meaning. Tis is crucial for understanding
the legal fction as a mechanism of legal reasoning.
More generally, the tension between legal meaning and external reality found
in legal fction is connected to a foundational process of human understanding.
Recall that, as Fuller argued, the world of legal ideas, which is in tension with
the real world, is not a counterfeit of external reality but “an instrument which
enables us to orient ourselves in this world of reality.”101 In this way, the process
represented by legal fctions points to a fundamental trait of human reasoning.102
It is a process of assimilating the unfamiliar with what is already known—an
adaptation of human understanding.103 Even though fctions are untrue in one
sense, they are also real insofar as they enable all that can be known to us within the
feld of law.104 In similar terms, Hans Kelsen described the work of legal fction as
a process of making sense of actual reality: “[A] fction is characterized both by its
end and by the means through which this end is reached. Te end is the cognition
of the actual world; the means, however, is a fabrication, a contradiction, a sleight
of hand, a detour and passage of thought.”105 For Kelsen, fction is the cognitive
process of thought that “takes a detour in knowing its object…a detour in which
it consciously sets itself in contradiction to this object; and be it only in order
101. Fuller, supra note 63 at 105.
102. Ibid at 94.
103. Ibid at 65. Lind agrees, pointing out that truth is comprehensive and that new truths must
be brought into accord with existing truths, either replacing or adjusting the whole system in
order to accommodate the new (Lind, supra note 74 at 91-92).
104. Fuller, supra note 63 at 121. In particular, Fuller writes that
[o]ur concepts…are the constructs of our minds which facilitate thought by rendering
comparison en masse possible. As all thinking proceeds through analogy and comparison,
thought will be speeded up if we can group related phenomena into units convenient for
comparison. But these constructs must be seen as instruments of thought only; we must
treat them as servants to be discharged as soon as they have fulflled their functions. Tey are
foreign elements which may be inserted into the equation provisionally to render computation
simpler, but which must be dropped from the fnal reckoning.

105. Hans Kelsen, “On the Teory of Juridical Fictions: With Special Consideration of Vaihinger’s
Philosophy of the ‘As If,’” translated by Christoph Kletzer in Del Mar & Twining, supra
note 62, 3 at 4.
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to better grasp it.”106 Tis “detour” and turning away from reality represented by
legal fction is necessary for apprehending and understanding reality at all.
Tis foundational process of meaning formation that lies at the heart of
legal fctions is an instance of what is described elsewhere as the creation of
symbolic forms of meaning. Te process of forming symbolic meaning afrms
much of what we have already noted about legal fctions. But it also brings focus
towards the way that the law’s engagement with reality through legal fctions—in
particular with religious reality—is a dialectic encounter between the legal and
religious.107 Te signifcance of this is that it ofers further insight into the nature
of legal fctions, in terms of their power as well as their limitations.
Symbols, by defnition, involve a gap between the sign and the thing to
which the sign refers.108 Te symbolic, as a form of meaning, is basically an
in-between realm—the images humanity interposes between itself and reality
function to separate humanity from the world and to simultaneously bring
the world closer.109 Te symbolic object acts upon the subject since the subject
can only access the world through the mediation of the symbolic object.110
By objectifying meaning in a concrete sign, symbolic meaning gains a power
of its own—not simply as a refection of existing reality, but as containing its
own unique and formative power.111 Te interpenetration between subject and
object through the mediation of the symbol creates a permanent and enduring
thing that we are capable of apprehending.112 Individual symbols do not have
meaning as isolated units. Rather, their meaning is tied to what Ernst Cassirer
called “symbolic forms” of meaning. Science, mythology, religion, art, language,
106. Ibid at 5.
107. Ernst Cassirer, Te Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol 1: Language, translated by Ralph
Manheim (Yale University Press, 1953) [PSF 1] at 93.
108. See e.g. Te Oxford English Dictionary, 3d ed (Oxford University Press: 2010) sub verbo
“symbol”. Te second defnition of “symbol” in the Oxford English Dictionary is “a thing
that represents or stands for something else.”
109. Ernst Cassirer, “‘Spirit’ and ‘Life’ in Contemporary Philosophy” in Paul Arthur Schilpp,
ed, Te Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer: Te Library of Living Philosophers Vol IV (Te Library of
Living Philosophers, 1949) 855 at 874. See also Tomas Meisenhelder, “Law as Symbolic
Action: Kenneth Burke’s Sociology of Law” (1981) 4 Symbolic Interaction 43 at 44-46.
110. Cassirer, PSF 1, supra note 107 at 107 and 112. Cassirer argued that reality is always only
accessible through symbolic forms of meaning and that acquiring a sign is really what
constitutes the frst step toward knowledge of the nature of a thing.
111. See Deniz Coskun, Law as Symbolic Form: Ernst Cassirer and the Anthropocentric View of Law
(Springer, 2007) at 193.
112. Cassirer, PSF 1, supra note 108 at 89. For a similar description of the dialectic process at the
foundation of social reality, see also P Berger, Sacred Canopy, supra note 13, and P Berger &
Luckmann, supra note 14.
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and law are all examples of diferent symbolic forms. Each instance of symbolic
meaning refects a symbolic form.113 It is in this way that symbols are part of the
foundation of human knowledge and the reality of human existence.114
Tis dialectic process of symbolic meaning—and hence also of legal
fctions—involves a risk. Cassirer noted that the creation of symbolic meaning
tends to “imprint its own characteristic stamp on the whole realm of being
and the whole life of spirit,”115 and by doing so it tends to undermine other
forms of symbolic meaning.116 In other words, if one form of symbolic meaning
comes to be thought of as true and real, then other forms of symbolic meaning
become less real. From this view, legal fctions walk a fne line: Although they
are necessary for knowing and confronting reality, they may also come to be
seen as something more than they are and so dominate the way that reality is
understood. Te risk is not simply about the meaning of one particular object,
but the possibility of seeing the object diferently. If a legal fction displaces
other possible ways of understanding an object, then the legal form of meaning
displaces or undermines other non-legal forms of meaning. Te legal fction then
colonizes our understanding.
What is at stake, then, in the law’s apprehension of religion, is the persistence
of the religious form of meaning within the law’s domain. Te theory of symbolic
meaning underscores the importance of preserving an awareness of the power and
the limits of legal fctions. It is crucial to remain aware of the way in which the
law’s apprehension of religion involves an interaction between legal and religious
ways of knowing. Without this awareness of religious forms of meaning, including
the social-symbolic process it involves, the legal form of meaning refected in
the law’s apprehension of religion will take on a totalizing force. Evaluating the
legal fction of law’s apprehension of religion is not about uncovering the true
essence of religion, but about understanding the function of the law’s conception
of religion within the law and considering the relationship between it and the
religion’s own conception of itself. A crucial part of this is that the legal and
religious are both deeply social forms of meaning. Both are formed through the
symbolic process of meaning formation, and the intersection between them must

113. Ibid note 107 at 86.
114. See Meisenhelder, supra note 109 at 44-46.
115. Cassirer, PSF 1, supra note 108 at 81. Cassirer writes, “True human knowledge can nowhere
dispense with symbols and signs; but it is precisely this that characterizes it as human.” Also
see Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture (Yale
University Press, 1944), at 25-26.
116. Ibid at 113-14.
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recognize and preserve the process of their interaction. Te law’s apprehension
of religion must not displace the meaning produced within the religious context.
From this view, the intersection between the legal and religious forms of
meaning is a kind of relational encounter, which carries an ethical dimension.117
Robert Cover described the creation of legal meaning as “[entailing] the
disengagement of the self from the ‘object’ of law, and at the same time requir[ing]
an engagement to that object as a faithful ‘other.’”118 In the same way, a symbol
is a statement connected to an “other”—just as a fction is connected to another
system of meaning—but they also contain some distance from the “other,”
which leaves them with a sort of interdependence.119 As such, a legal fction must
recognize and sustain the external reality and meaning of the thing to which it
relates. In terms of the law’s apprehension of religion, the law’s conception of
religion must not occupy a position of exclusivity or dominance in relation to
religious meaning. Although the law’s apprehension of religion is for the purposes
of the law, it must nevertheless remain faithful in its relation to lived religious life
and the religious form of meaning.
Te law’s apprehension of religion will always seem insufcient in relation
to the reality of religion because the law is a diferent form of meaning oriented
towards diferent purposes than religion. Te law does not concern itself with
religion qua religion—as a brute social fact—but as an object of legal reality. With
this in mind, it would be inappropriate to try to square the law’s apprehension
of religion with the lived reality of religion. Te goal instead should be to
understand the law’s limited view of religion in its functional (and symbolic)
context. As I have argued, this points beyond the conceptual specifcs of the
law’s apprehension of religion as an object, and instead towards the process of the
interaction between law and religion. As James MacLean observed:

117. For further discussion of the implications of a relational model to the interpretation
of constitutional rights more generally, see Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Rights as
Relationship” (1993) 1 Rev Const Stud 1. Despite the thematic overlap, my analysis is quite
diferent than Nedelsky’s. Nedelsky proposed that rights should be interpreted and applied in
a way that foregrounds how law structures relationships and fosters the kinds of relationships
that we value relationships through the language of rights. Tis, for her, makes judicial review
of constitutional rights claims a kind of democratic discourse and source of institutional
accountability.
118. Robert Cover, “Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” (1983) 97 Harv L Rev 4 at 45.
119. Gabriel Motzkin, “Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: A Foundational Reading” in
Jefrey Andrew Barash, Te Symbolic Construction of Reality: Te Legacy of Ernst Cassirer
(University of Chicago Press, 2008) 73 at 86.
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We can see then how we need our abstractions; they are useful constructs, tools. Te
problem arises when we begin to think of them as real, when we forget that they
are symbols pointing to and participating in a reality beyond them. But we have
forgotten how to think beyond the ‘things’ arrested from experience.120

To view the law’s apprehension of religion as a legal fction is, therefore,
a kind of reminder. Te law’s apprehension of religion is inevitably a reductive
view of religion. But this enables law to wrestle with religion in law, and to address
through law an important part of human experience that deeply afects peoples’
lives. Apprehending religion in the law gives voice to religion in the discourse
of law. But it is also crucial to keep a critical view of the law’s apprehension of
religion, to ensure that the fctional creation of religion in law is not taken to
be separate from the processes of interaction by which law constructs its own
reality (including through its interaction with religion). In order to guard against
mistaking the law’s apprehension of religion for religious reality, it is necessary to
identify the fctional quality—including its social-symbolic processes—that is at
the forefront of the analysis of the law’s encounter with religion.
To briefy recap, reorienting the law’s apprehension of religion in terms of
legal fction opens up a set of ideas that are extremely helpful. It prioritizes the
constitutive aspect of the social interaction between law and religion rather than
particular claims of “truth” that are thought to distinguish them. It highlights
the ways that fctions are for particular communities, in particular situations,
and towards particular purposes. It also recognizes that law’s apprehension of
religion is necessarily limited and incomplete. Although the law’s apprehension of
religion is not dependent on external understandings of religion, it is nevertheless
intertwined with them. As a legal fction, the law’s apprehension of religion
carries the risk of crystalizing its own view of reality as the objective truth of
reality. Allowing this would betray the “ethical” dimension of fctions as a form
of symbolic meaning, as it would undermine the relational interdependence
between diferent forms of meaning—legal and religious—and inhibit the
process by which legal and religious meanings are created in the frst place.

III. THEORY IN ACTION—USING LEGAL FICTION AS A LENS
TO ANALYZE CASES
In response to the argument so far, this section will examine three case examples
through the lens of legal fction. First, I will briefy return to the Bentley case to
120. James MacLean, Rethinking Law as Process: Creativity, Novelty, Change
(Routledge, 2012) at 86.
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explore what the notion of legal fction ofers to the previous analysis of the case.
Tis will, of course, be a fairly short refection, which leads into a more detailed
discussion of the Multani and Ktunaxa Nation decisions. In all of these cases,
we see the courts struggling with how to ft religious meaning into the analysis
of the guiding principles of law. Tis common struggle appears in diferent
guises in the cases, and each infects the earlier discussion of legal fction and the
social-symbolic process at play in the law’s apprehension of religion.
Te purpose of this section is twofold. First, it is to show the descriptive
and critical potential of using the notion of legal fction, as a mechanism of
legal reasoning, to analyze cases that involve the law’s intersection with religion.
Secondly, the discussion of these cases concretizes the process and the limitations
of law’s apprehension of religion as legal fction. Te lens of legal fction reminds us
of the social interactive dimensions at work in the law’s apprehension of religion.
A. BENTLEY—THE IMPORTANCE OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT

Te earlier discussion of Bentley focused on the gap between the law’s apprehension
of religion and the lived experience of religion. I suggested that the challenge of
the gap is unavoidable. It is helpful to remind ourselves of this now so that there
is no misplaced expectation that the lens of legal fction will somehow resolve the
gap. Tis reminder also draws attention to one of the most important takeaways
from the discussion of legal fctions: Te apprehension of Anglicanism in Bentley
should not be evaluated in terms of its accuracy in representing what Anglicanism
really is. As a legal fction, the courts’ view of Anglicanism is a feature of the law’s
reality; it is a mechanism of legal reasoning that is meant to achieve the purposes
of the law. Te apprehension of Anglicanism in Bentley must be understood for
what it is and what it means within the law’s reality.
It is also crucial to acknowledge that the legal fction of Anglicanism has
a real efect on the Anglican religion. Te court’s refusal in Bentley to grant the
departing congregations any part in the church property has profound fnancial
implications for both sides of the dispute. More importantly, the decision
efectively sets the path for the future of Anglicanism in Canada. Te departing
congregations are now legally sanctioned through Bentley as an essentially
non-Anglican faction that broke away from the true Anglican Church in Canada.
Tis profoundly afects the possibilities for the future evolution of the relationship
between the ACC and the ANiC, efectively crystalizing the diferences between
the two. If, on the other hand, the Court of Appeal in Bentley had adopted the
plaintif’s more abstract view of Anglican ministry, it would have set in motion
a fairly radical rearrangement of the Anglican Church in Canada. Te authority
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of the bishops would have been subjected to a higher orthodoxy, which would
empower local congregations in a way that would change the governance of
Anglicanism in Canada. Whether one agrees with the result of Bentley is beside
the point. In either case, the decision of the court has a profound infuence on
the development of Anglicanism in Canada, which is mediated through the legal
fction of Anglicanism that the court adopted.
Te fact of the infuence of the law on the evolution of the religious
community should not be surprising in light of the earlier discussion of legal
fctions, and it is not itself a basis to reject the Bentley decision. Te law plays
a constructive role in relation to religion, which means that religion—here, the
Anglican religion—is not simply discovered by the law. Whenever a court seeks
to apprehend religion in order to make a decision, it is, in a way, creating the very
thing that it sets out to discover.121 Te legal fction of Anglicanism in Bentley is true
in a very specifc sense, which is to say that it is for the purpose of resolving the
confict before the court.
It is also important to remember that a legal fction does not spring from
nowhere, but it emerges from the interaction between legal and religious forms of
meaning. Tat is to say, the court’s constructive role is not carried out in isolation,
but dialectically with religion. In Bentley, the court’s apprehension of Anglicanism
emerges in response to the ideas of Anglicanism brought before the court. Te
court’s decision is, and it must be understood to be, about some of the deep
ambiguities within the Anglican religion. Te court’s job is not to resolve these
ambiguities but to translate them into the language of the law for the purposes
of deciding the case. When doing this, the court must be mindful of the dialectic
encounter between its decision and the lived experience of the Anglican religion,
and ensure that the law’s reality does not assume a totalizing posture in relation
to the religious meaning of Anglicanism (and the process of meaning formation
within the religious tradition). Tis is, in terms of legal fction, to preserve the
falsity of the court’s apprehension of Anglicanism, ensuring that the fction is
understood to be false in the technical sense discussed above.
Tis means that although the Court of Appeal in Bentley was right to
confdently assert its fction in order to achieve its ends, it should also have
conscientiously avoided settling or setting aside the ambiguities of Anglicanism
in the process of making its decision. As mentioned earlier, the court seems
to have failed to do this, which can be seen in the fairly defnitive language it
used to describe Anglicanism. Although the court seems to be trying to preserve
the autonomy of Anglican communities to control the way they appear in law,
121. I am indebted to Christopher Lund for this phraseology.
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its decision goes beyond what was necessary to decide the matter and ends up
constructing an overly robust view of the Anglican religion. Te efect of the
judgment on the future of Anglicanism in Canada, particularly the relationship
between the ANiC and the ACC, is therefore more pronounced than is necessary.
A lack of judicial awareness of this efect is an example of the risk that comes along
with legal fctions: Te law’s meaning may strongly infuence how something is
understood outside of the judicial context. In this case, the law’s apprehension of
Anglicanism displaces the development of the meaning of Anglican worship that
otherwise occurs within the Anglican religion.
Drawing attention to these elements of the law’s apprehension of religion
should inspire a level of caution in the judicial ofce whenever the court must
engage with a religious idea when making a legal decision.122 Had the court’s
decision been framed more tentatively, avoiding statements about the true nature
of Anglicanism, the totalizing force of the decision may have been mitigated.
Preserving the ambiguities of Anglicanism within the law’s apprehension of
Anglicanism would serve two ends: It would keep the religious community active
in constructing its own meaning and maintain the law’s interaction with religion
as a dialectic between diferent systems of meaning.
B. MULTANI—THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL MEANING THROUGH THE
APPREHENSION OF RELIGION

Many of the concerns raised in relation to the Bentley case can also be seen in
the Multani case, although in diferent ways. In Multani, we witness the Court
struggling over how to capture the Sikh kirpan in law. In this case, the SCC
addressed the refusal of a public-school board to grant religious accommodation
to a Sikh boy that would have allowed him to bring his kirpan—in this case,
a large metal dagger—to school. Te case was decided through a Charter analysis
of whether the school board’s decision to refuse to accommodate the religious
practice of carrying a metal kirpan violated Multani’s religious freedom, and
whether that limit to his religious freedom could be justifed under section 1

122. Benjamin L Berger made a similar argument in relation to the cultural paradigm of the
constitutional rule of law, arguing that adopting a cultural lens for examining the law’s
intersection with religion increases our awareness of the cultural force exerted by the law and
should inspire a judicial attitude of humility. See, e.g. B Berger, Law’s Religion, supra note 7 at
103-04, 170. Also see B Berger, “Religious Freedom,” supra note 16.
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of the Charter.123 When the court’s decision is viewed through the lens of legal
fction, we see a cogent example of the interactive process of the formation of
legal meaning, which in this case involved the intersection between legal, social,
and religious conceptions of reality. Te way that conficting or competing
meanings are brought and held together in dynamic tension is at the heart of
a legal fction. Looking closely at the Multani decision (primarily the majority
reasons), we see the theory of legal fction in action. Te failure of the Court to
be fully aware of the process of creating a legal fction helps to explain some of
the difculties I identify with the decision. Multani is therefore an example of the
process of creating legal fctions, which develops our understanding of the law’s
apprehension of the legal fction of religion and how courts might use it.
Te Court in Multani sought to navigate between the religious meaning
of the kirpan and other social perceptions caused by its physical attributes.
Te kirpan in question was an imposing object—a 20 cm metal knife.124 Te
school board’s argument against allowing the kirpan in school was that it was
objectively dangerous, that it symbolized violence, and that its presence would
have a poisoning efect on the safe environment of the school.125 Competing
against this understanding of the kirpan was its religious meaning. Sikhs carry
kirpans as an integral part of their religious practice.126 According to the evidence
of the appellants, Sikhism teaches pacifsm and respect for other religions and
emphasizes that the kirpan is never to be used as a weapon or to hurt anyone; for
Sikhs, the kirpan is a symbol of mercy, kindness, and honour, and would never
be used for violence.127 Te Court held that maintaining a reasonable level of
safety in school did not require a total ban on carrying kirpans in school.128 It was
thus unreasonable for the school board to reject the accommodation agreement
123. It should be noted that this analysis followed that in Doré v Barreau du Québec, [2012]
1 SCR 395, where the Court held that in evaluating administrative decision-making the
standard of review is reasonableness and not the test in R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103
(applying s 1 of the Charter). Te new Doré analysis and the old analysis used in Multani
(the Oakes test), although distinct, are in “conceptual harmony” because both work the same
“justifcatory muscles” of proportionality (ibid at paras 5 and 57).
124. Multani, supra note 23 at para 87.
125. Ibid at paras 37, 55, 71.
126. Tis is a central tenant of the Sikh faith along with uncut hair (under a turban), carrying
a wooden comb, wearing a kaccha undergarment and a steel bracelet. Tese “Five Ks” of
the orthodox Sikh faith (kesh, kangha, kara, kaccha and kirpan) were noted in ibid at para
36. See also, SikhNet, “Who are Sikhs? What is Sikhism?” (last visited 17 September 2020)
online: <www.sikhnet.com/thesikhs>.
127. Multani, supra note 23 at paras 36 and 37.
128. Ibid at para 67.
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reached by the appellants and the school for Mr. Multani to carry his kirpan
under restricted conditions (sheathed, and sewn into a cloth envelope).
What makes this case remarkable is not the result reached by the Court, but
how the Court struggled with the religious meaning, physical features, and other
social perceptions of the kirpan in the process of giving it legal meaning. Te
Court tied these various elements together under the law. Viewing this through
the lens of legal fction helps us see the Court’s decision as a process of knitting the
various physical and social features of the kirpan (its religious and social symbolic
meaning, as well as its physical features) together into the reality of the law.
Ultimately, the Court reconciled the divergent views of the kirpan by describing
the kirpan in the language of constitutional values—of diversity, tolerance, and
respect. Te emerging image of the kirpan wove together the understandings of
individuals (Sikhs and students) and diferent groups (Sikh communities and
schools) through the story of legal constitutional values. As a result, the kirpan
became a fction within the law of multiculturalism and religious freedom, which
the Court said required respect and accommodation from everyone within
the law’s world.
If we break down the majority analysis in Multani and examine how the
process of forming the legal meaning of the kirpan works, we will see that the
decision is an excellent example of the rich intersection between diferent forms
of meaning that occurs with a legal fction. In this sense, the Multani decision is a
positive example of the law’s apprehension of religion as a legal fction. However,
the decision sufers from a lack of consistency in its treatment and a lack of
transparency in the assertion of legal meaning in the process of synthesizing the
various meanings within the legal fction of the kirpan. As a result, the legal
fction produced in the law’s apprehension of the kirpan fails to recognize the
active role played by the Court and its understanding of legal constitutional
values, and so fails to respect one of the fundamental limits of legal fctions—to
prevent one form of meaning from dominating the scope of what is understood
to be real and true. Put slightly diferently, the Court’s apprehension of the kirpan
was ofered as a way to resolve the tensions surrounding the diferent forms of
meaning given to the kirpan. But, as was seen in the earlier discussion of legal
fctions, legal fctions do not resolve or transcend these tensions. Imagining that
a legal fction can do this is to misunderstand the legal fction as something more
than it really is. Legal fctions are grounded in the tensions between diferent
meanings of the thing (in this case, the kirpan) and, in a sense, depend on these
diferent forms of meaning to remain alive.
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Both the majority and minority opinions of the Court recognized the
intersection between the religious and physical meanings of the kirpan in
deciding the case. For the majority, Justice Charron described the kirpan as “a
religious object that resembles a dagger.”129 Likewise, the minority described the
kirpan as “while a kind of ‘knife,’…above all a religious object.”130 Te clear use of
“fctional” language to frame the law’s apprehension of the kirpan is noteworthy
here, as is the initial prioritization of the religious meaning of the kirpan.
Finding for the majority that there was a violation of Mr. Multani’s religious
freedom, Justice Charron said that it would be wrong to focus entirely on the
physical characteristics of the kirpan.131 Te fact that the kirpan was a large (and
potentially dangerous) knife did not mean that it could not be protected as a
matter of religious freedom. On the other hand, the Court also noted that despite
its “profound religious signifcance,” the kirpan “also has the characteristics of a
bladed weapon and can therefore cause injury.”132 Te physical features of the
kirpan established a rational connection between banning the kirpan from school
and the legislative goal of fostering reasonable safety in school. Tese two aspects
of the kirpan collided at the stage of evaluating whether a total ban from school
“minimally impairs” young Gurbaj Multani’s religious freedom, or whether it was
possible to accommodate him in a way that did not impose an undue burden on
the school (and fellow students).133
Te question for the Court was what to do with this collision between the
religious and physical aspects of the kirpan. What legal salience should be given
to the religious meaning of the kirpan for the appellant, Gurbaj Multani, and
how does this ft with the risks of allowing the kirpan into school? In other
words, what is the kirpan within the law’s reality? Framed this way, the answer is
a legal fction, because it stands between multiple contradictory claims about the
meaning of the kirpan.
Te Court struggled to navigate between the competing meanings. According
to the school board, there was a risk that the kirpan would be used for violence and

129. Ibid at para 3.
130. Ibid at para 98.
131. See ibid at para 37. As Justice Charron notes “[t]he question at this stage of the
analysis cannot be answered defnitively by considering only the physical characteristics
of the kirpan.”
132. Ibid at para 49.
133. Ibid at para 52. Te Court held that the constitutional standard of “minimal impairment”
(part of the proportionality analysis established in Oakes, supra note 123) requires “reasonable
accommodation” (where the argument of “undue hardship” comes from).
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that this possibility would negatively afect the school environment.134 Regarding
the risk that the kirpan would be used for violence, the Court noted that there
was no evidence that the appellant, Gurbaj Multani, posed such a risk.135 Te
Court went on to note some very broad evidence showing that there were almost
no recorded incidences of Sikhs using their kirpans for violence.136 In particular,
the Court noted that there have been no reported incidents of a kirpan being used
for violence in an Ontario school over the last 100 years.137 Tis remarkable fact
was attributed to the Sikh understanding of the kirpan as a symbol of peace that
was not to be used for violence. For the Court, this evidence showed that there
was no support for a total ban of kirpans from school on the basis (as tendered by
the school board) that “kirpans are inherently dangerous objects.”138
From these observations, it appeared that the Court was setting up to say
that in spite of the physical design of the kirpan, the religious beliefs of Sikhs
could be trusted, such that in the eyes of the law, a kirpan in the hands of a Sikh
is not dangerous and poses no risk to the public. Instead, the Court appealed to
other contextual factors that mitigated the risk that the kirpan could be used for
violence. In particular, the Court relied on the fact that the kirpan was rendered
inoperative under the conditions of accommodation imposed by the Superior
Court.139 Te Court also insisted on the importance of environmental context for
determining reasonable restrictions on kirpans. Te ongoing relationship between
Mr. Multani and the school was important for evaluating the risk involved in
carrying the kirpan. Tis unique feature of the school environment distinguished
other contexts, like courtrooms and airplanes, where bans on kirpans have been
judicially upheld.140
On the surface, these factors seem like sensible and pragmatic parts of the
decision. As long as the harmful potential of the kirpan is neutralized—as the
Court found it was in this case (both in terms of the conditions imposed on
Mr. Multani to carry the kirpan, as well as on the statistical non-violent usage of
kirpans in the hands of a Sikh)—then there is no reason to prohibit it in school.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Multani, supra note 23 at para 55.
Ibid at para 57.
Ibid at paras 59-61.
Ibid at 59.
Ibid at para 67.
Ibid at para 98. In the concurring words of the minority decision, the kirpan was “almost
totally stripped of its objectively dangerous characteristics.”
140. See ibid at paras 63-66. Te Court distinguished Hothi v R, [1985] 3 WWR 256 [Hothi],
which prohibited bringing a kirpan into an assault trial; and Nijjar v Canada 3000 Airlines
Ltd (1999), 36 CHRR D/76 (CHRT) [Nijjar], which prohibited a kirpan on an airplane.
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From this view, some danger can be tolerated, but not too much. While the
Court was satisfed that the danger was neutralized based on the facts of the case,
they were not satisfed that the conditions would be met elsewhere.
However, it does not seem that a pragmatic solution was what the Court
was after. Te Court returned in its reasons to insist on the importance of the
religious symbolic meaning of the kirpan in response to the second “minimal
impairment” argument put forward by the school board. Relying on expert
evidence (from a psychologist) that the presence of the kirpan in school would
poison the school environment, the school board alleged that to allow Multani
to carry the kirpan would send the message that weapons are a legitimate way to
resolve confict and would incite feelings of unfairness towards Sikh students.141
Te Court responded to this argument by saying that religious tolerance is an
important value in democratic society and schools have a special role in instilling
this value in students.142 Te attitude that disregards the symbolic religious
value of the kirpan because of its physical features stifes the promotion of
multiculturalism, diversity, and respect for those who are diferent.143 As such,
“[a] total prohibition against wearing a kirpan to school undermines the value of
this religious symbol.”144 Te possibility (or probability) that the kirpan would
incite this type of response from students was not a reason for banning it. Instead,
it exposed people’s ignorance of Sikhism. Te Court saw the negative perception
of the kirpan as a call to the education system to double its eforts to promote
awareness of diferent cultures and religious traditions so that people would know
that a kirpan is not a weapon for a Sikh, but a symbol of peace.
It is helpful to note that the kirpan, as an object with symbolic religious
meaning, does not speak for itself. As Suzanna Mancini noted, “Symbols do
not have a univocal signifcance…the signifcance attributed to [objects] refects
the culture, the beliefs, the choices of those who see them.”145 Te “reality” and
meaning of the kirpan is always mediated through people in the community,
whether that be Sikh individuals and their community, or the risky and dangerous
meaning perceived by other students and the school. Te same is true for the
Court’s apprehension of the kirpan in law. Te Court’s statement, quoted above,
that a total ban on the kirpan undermines its value, should be seen not just in
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Multani, supra note 23 at paras 70-74.
Ibid at para 76.
Ibid at para 78.
Ibid at para 79.
“Te Power of Symbols and Symbols of Power: Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of
Cultural Convergence” (2009) 30 Cardozo L Rev 2629 at 2655.
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terms of the Sikh religion but also in terms of the law’s reality. In the course of
making its decision the Court apprehended the kirpan, and in doing so gave it
value for us in the law.
To see the law’s apprehension of the kirpan as a legal fction reminds us that
the “reality” and meaning of the kirpan given by the law does not stand separate
and apart from the process by which meaning is given to it in these diferent
contexts. Tis intersection between diferent forms of meaning is, of course, one
of the central features of legal fction discussed earlier. Legal fctions appear where
there is a collision between diferent systems of meaning, created by diferent
communities, that provide diferent meanings for the thing at issue. Here, we see
a collision between the forms of meaning provided by the school, by the Sikh
faith, and by the law.
Tere is another layer of complexity here because the law’s apprehension of
the kirpan involved the intersection not just between the meanings of the school
and the Sikh religion, but also of the values of the law itself. In order to determine
the legal meaning of the kirpan—to apprehend it in the law, and to set the law’s
response to the confict in the Multani case—the various other meanings (religious
and otherwise) were subsumed into a higher order of meaning established in the
law. Te Court’s analysis showed that, for the purposes of law, the kirpan does
not only represent what Sikhs believe (peace, non-violence, et cetera.), nor what
other common members perceive. Instead, the Court cast the kirpan as a symbol
of the constitutional values of multiculturalism, tolerance, diversity, and respect.
Tis settlement of the meaning of the kirpan is oriented around what the kirpan
means “for us” and for the purposes of the law, within the social context of the
Canadian political and legal tradition.
Tis is precisely the kind of collision and knitting together of diferent forms
of meaning described in the earlier discussion of legal fction. Te trouble with
the Court’s analysis is that it did not display any real awareness of, or refection
on, the interactive process at play in its decision between these various meanings
and the meanings and purposes of the law. In order to fully articulate the meaning
of the legal fction of the kirpan established here, the Court would have to clarify
the purposes of the law in order to show how the diverging perceptions of the
kirpan are drawn together to achieve something “for us.”
Te successive shift from the Sikh tradition’s understanding of the kirpan,
to a pragmatic risk analysis, and then back to a reassertion of the value of the
religious meaning of the kirpan, is somewhat mystifying. It shows a complex
series of layers and tensions between the various sources of meaning that informed
the apprehension of the kirpan in the law. Although the Sikh religious tradition
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was mentioned by the Court, it was not engaged with in any depth.146 Tis would
be consistent with the Amselem principle that the concern of a court of law is
not to determine the Sikh tradition’s understanding of the kirpan, and that the
legally salient source of the kirpan’s meaning should be the disposition of an
individual’s inner self.147 However, the Court referred to the Sikh tradition, not
to evaluate the sincerity of Mr. Multani’s beliefs, but to elaborate on and develop
the democratic and constitutionally protected values of multiculturalism and
religious tolerance. Te negative perception of the kirpan and what it represents (a
symbol of violence) was also recast in reference to the same constitutional values.
Te pragmatics of law and the ideological purposes of the constitutional
values present in the Court’s analysis stand at odds with each other. If the law’s
purpose is pragmatic, then it would seem unnecessary to say that the failure
to accommodate Multani’s kirpan in school was an afront to multiculturalism
and religious diversity. Te evidential facts that reduce the dangerousness of
the kirpan should carry the day. But if the law’s purpose is to promote and
advance constitutional values, then it is not clear what role the evidence of Sikh
non-violent use of the kirpan should have. Simply relying on evidence of safety
without further explanation suggests that multicultural and religious tolerance
depend on the physical risks and dangers of the culture and religion in question.
From this perspective, even though culture and religion “win,” they actually lose,
given that the decision to tolerate the carrying of a kirpan is not due to its cultural
or religious meaning but despite it. Tis seems to undermine the ideological goals
of multiculturalism and religious accommodation.148
Te trouble is not that the religious meaning was considered alongside
the dangerous physical features of the kirpan, nor that the law integrated the
religious meaning and other social perceptions of the kirpan into a unifed order
146. Te Sikh understanding of their religious practices and identity, which includes carrying
the kirpan, has evolved through a rich (and contested) historical tradition. See generally
Harjot Oberoi, Te Construction of Religious Boundaries: Culture, Identity, and Diversity in
the Sikh Tradition (University of Chicago Press, 1994). See also Pauljit Bhandal, “Problems
with the Current Interpretation of Section 2(a) of the Charter” (2019) [unpublished,
on fle with author].
147. See Amselem, supra note 3 at para 43.
148. See B Berger, Law’s Religion, supra note 7 at 158-59. Berger observes, albeit in a slightly
diferent context:
Even if I am successful in my religiously motivated claim, culture was irrelevant to the legal
conclusion. If my position is legally acceptable, it is so despite my cultural commitments
and only to the extent that I was capable of stripping my claim of the terms that make it
meaningful to me in the frst place. Te “win” is not a product of cross-cultural understanding;
rather it turns on the successful suppression of the dimension of culture.
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of constitutional meaning. Rather, the problem is that the Court did not provide
the conceptual grounds in its reasons for the connection it drew between the
physical characteristics, the individual subjective meanings, and the collective
meanings given to the kirpan. Instead, we were left with the mere assertion of the
law’s constitutional framework to coordinate the physical, cultural, social, and
religious dimensions of the case. Tis fails to explain how the diferent meanings
at stake relate to each other and how the intersection between them could lead to
the production of, and possible articulation as, a form of legal meaning.
Had the Court in Multani openly addressed the kirpan as a legal fction,
it could have ofered a more coherent account of its decision. Rather than
shifting back and forth somewhat confusingly between diferent factors related
to the kirpan and then asserting the constitutional values as primary, the notion
of legal fction would have made it possible to acknowledge these tensions and
relate them to the legal fction of the kirpan. Te court’s reasoning would be less
troubling because it would then be seen as constructing the legal fction of the
kirpan for its own purposes rather than trying to fnd and assert something of
what is really real about the kirpan. Distinguishing the legal fction of the kirpan
as a symbol of multiculturalism from the external truth and reality of the kirpan
would have preserved the integrity of the Court’s reasoning, as it would hold the
Court’s view of the kirpan in dynamic tension with the various lived experiences
of those connected to the kirpan—the religious Sikh community and those in
the school. Tis is precisely what legal fction recommends. Te legal fction of
the kirpan must retain the dynamic tensions of the intersection between diferent
meanings and communities. It synthesizes these meanings within the reality of
the law and for the law’s purposes; however, the synthesis is only tentative and
must be seen as such.
Te Court’s failure to engage in Multani with the terms of interaction between
diferent forms of meaning when apprehending the kirpan shows the importance
of taking the interactive process of legal fction into account within legal analysis.
Tis is evident in the challenges the Court encountered when trying to hold
the diferent forms of meaning together in a coherent legal analysis. It is also
evident in the way that that the Court’s apprehension of the kirpan left the
matter beholden to a world structured by the law and out of the reach of critical
refection. Approaching the law’s apprehension of religion in light of the nature
and limits of legal fction, as discussed earlier, brings the interaction between
meanings to the foreground and allows us to recontextualize and refect on the
appearance of religion within the law’s reality. Tis is an important step towards
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a better understanding and deeper engagement with the legal adjudication of
religious claims.
C. KTUNAXA NATION—DIVIDING THE SUBJECT AND OBJECT OF FAITH

In Ktunaxa Nation, we see the Court struggling to fnd a way to make sense of
a land-based dimension of an Indigenous spiritual claim within the framework
of religious freedom jurisprudence. Te big question that the Court needed to
address was how to ft an object that is the source of religious meaning—here, the
Grizzly Bear Spirit believed by the Ktunaxa to reside in a particular geographical
location—within the law’s conception of religion as protected in section 2(a) of
the Charter.149 Tis question parallels the Multani case insofar as it touches on
the way in which the law’s apprehension of a particular religious object does not
happen in isolation from a much more complex interaction between legal and
religious forms of meaning. But the Court’s approach to answering the question
in Ktunaxa Nation was unique. Here, the Court distinguished between the
subject and object of religious belief and refused protection of the latter within
the scope of religious freedom. I argue that this solution highlights a defciency
in the Court’s understanding of the process of law’s apprehension of religion.
In particular, by separating the subject and object of belief, the Court portrayed
religion in static terms, which divorced Ktunaxa beliefs from the reality of the
lived Ktunaxa religious experience. On the one hand, this made the matter easy for
the Court to dispense with. On the other, it left the Court unable to fully engage
with the religious claim. Not only did this exclude protection for the Ktunaxa
religious claim, but it also hid the intersection between legal and religious forms
of meaning at stake in the case. Te legal form of meaning is asserted over the
religious without allowing an opportunity to refect on and engage with either
the Ktunaxa conception of its religious beliefs or the underlying basis of the law’s
conception of religion.
Te Ktunaxa Nation confict arose when the British Columbia (BC)
government approved a proposal to develop a year-round ski resort in the Jumbo
Valley of the east Kootenay Mountains. Te Jumbo Valley is located within the
traditional territories claimed by the Ktunaxa Indigenous communities and is
known to them as Qat’muk, which is the place where the Grizzly Bear Spirit
lives. Tere was a long and drawn-out process of reviews, studies, and discussions
beginning in 1991, leading to the approval of the development plan in 2011.150
149. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
150. Ktunaxa Nation SCC, supra note 24 at para 13.
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Te Ktunaxa were involved from the earliest stages and constantly resisted the
development throughout the process. Tey expressed concern about the efects
of the development on the land and on local animals (especially the local grizzly
bear population). Teir resistance was grounded in a sense that the land is sacred
and contributes to the cultural and religious life of the Ktunaxa communities.
When the development was approved, Ktunaxa sued. Tey argued that the
approval violated their 2(a) religious freedom and section 35 rights (under the
duty to consult). A key premise of their claim was that the proposed development
in Qat’muk would drive the Grizzly Bear Spirit away and, hence, decimate the
spiritual lives of the Ktunaxa people.
For the Ktunaxa, the spiritual value of the land is a fact of the nature of the
land itself and is intricately connected to the religious beliefs of the Ktunaxa
people. As one afant explained, “spirits like Grizzly Spirit have their own places.
Te Creator has put them here with us to help us lead happy lives in this world.
Teir places are not our places. We cannot treat these places any way we want…
To destroy a spirit’s place, to make it unsuitable to the spirit, would make the
spirit homeless.”151 For the Ktunaxa, the land is not empty but has a nature,
a spirit, with value and interests of its own. For the Ktunaxa, their religion is
dependent on the land. Te Qat’muk valley is a spiritual anchoring point for
the community. One afant declared that “Qat’muk provides for our Ktunaxa
culture security in the present and continuity of that spiritual and cultural
security into the future. It enables Ktunaxa citizens collectively to renew and
continue, and in certain cases individually to tap into deep and anchored roots
in the world as Ktunaxa.”152
For the SCC, these two dimensions of the Ktunaxa claim—that the land has
religious signifcance on its own and that the religion of the community depends
on the land—could not be held together but had to be separated. Te majority of
the SCC agreed with the lower courts to uphold the approval of the development
and refuse to protect the spiritual interest claimed by the Ktunaxa.153 Te central
151. Ktunaxa Nation SCC, supra note 24 (Factum of the Appellant at para 22).
152. Ibid at para 27.
153. Ktunaxa Nation SCC, supra note 24 at paras 8, 115. See Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia
(Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2014 BCSC 568 [Ktunaxa Nation SC
(TD)], af’d 2015 BCCA 352 [Ktunaxa Nation CA]. Both the Supreme Court of British
Columbia (BCSC) and the Court of Appeal of British Columbia (BCCA) upheld the
government approval of the development plan, refusing to protect the Ktunaxa spiritual
claim. Te focus of both the BCSC and BCCA was that religious meaning could be used
to restrict or guide others in the otherwise lawful use of land. Te BCSC held that section
2(a) of the Charter does not confer a right to restrict the otherwise lawful use of land on
the basis that such use would result in loss of meaning to religious practices carried on
elsewhere (Ktunaxa Nation SC (TD), at para 296). Te BCCA held that section 2(a) of the

808

(2022) 59 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

dictum of the SCC decision was to distinguish between the subject and object
of religious belief and to clarify that religious freedom does not extend to protect
the object of belief—it protects only the freedom to hold or to manifest a belief:
“In short, the Charter protects the freedom to worship, but does not protect the
spiritual focal point of worship.”154
Dividing the subject and object of religious belief had a signifcant efect
on the way that the Court construed the Ktunaxa religious claim. Te majority
framed the Ktunaxa claim as “not seeking protection for the freedom to believe
in Grizzly Bear Spirit or to pursue practices related to it. Rather, [the Ktunaxa]
seek to protect Grizzly Bear Spirit itself and the subjective spiritual meaning
they derive from it.”155 It is interesting to note that the Court here did not deny
that the Grizzly Bear Spirit might be present in Qat’muk. Rather, this spiritual
fact was treated as irrelevant because the freedom protected in section 2(a) is
entirely concerned with the freedom to hold and manifest belief. Belief here is
distinguished from the spiritual facts on which belief is based. What is protected
is the ability to try to derive spiritual meaning from an object and the ability
to pursue spiritual meaning, not the spiritual meaning itself. Belief, therefore,
is portrayed as the triumph of the subject and what the subject is able to derive
from the object of belief. Te Court conceptualized religious freedom in a way
that severs the beliefs of individuals from the objects of those beliefs.
Tis is a legal fction about the nature of religious belief. Dividing the subject
and object of faith, as the majority did, apprehended the religious dimension of the
Ktunaxa claim separate from the social-symbolic process by which that religious
meaning is created. Protecting subjective belief and excluding protection for the
object of belief denies the possibility of religious meaning persisting external to
the believing subject, which the Ktunaxa said was their experience. As discussed
earlier, the process by which symbolic meaning is created suggests that symbolic
objects—like religious objects—actually do take on a level of reality and
autonomy separate from the subjects that give them meaning. Individuals and
their religious communities vest objects with religious symbolic meaning. Once
the symbolic meaning is created, it gains a life and force of its own. Religious
objects in turn infuence the beliefs of the individuals who vested the object with

Charter does not apply to protect the subjective meaning of a religious community when
the subjective meaning depends on others being required to act (or refrain from acting) in a
manner consistent with a belief that they do not share (Ktunaxa Nation CA, at paras 73-74).
154. Ktunaxa Nation SCC, supra note 24 at paras 70-71.
155. Ibid.
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religious meaning.156 Tis is not to say that religious objects are above subjects,
because to do so would fetishize objects. Rather, it is to emphasize the dialectic
process of engagement between subjects and objects of faith.
Te Court’s decision to divide subjects and objects of belief rather drastically
isolates and fattens the idea of religion and religious meaning within the law.
Te only reality that matters is the reality of the free subject; the only thing that
is sacred is what the individual can make sacred on her own. Tis undoubtedly
is tethered to a particular, and popular, view of the philosophical commitments
of liberal democratic order.157 Tere is no acknowledgement or engagement with
this in the judicial analysis. Instead, the fctional division of the subject and
object of belief is taken as true and natural to religion. Te intersection between
the legal and Ktunaxa forms of meaning in the law’s apprehension of religion is
overlooked, and the result is a fairly stark privileging of the legal conception of
religious belief. As a result, the religious claim of the Ktunaxa is apprehended as
non-religious for the purposes of section 2(a) of the Charter.
Touching on this point, Justice Moldaver argued in dissent that protecting
only the believing subject, divorced from the religious meaning of religious
objects, is nothing more than a formal protection of empty gestures and hollow
actions.158 Justice Moldaver said that it must be recognized that the law’s
interference with religion cannot be seen through only one particular vision of
what counts as religious “belief ”: “To ensure that all religions are aforded the
same level of protection under section 2(a), courts must be alive to the unique
characteristics of each religion, and the distinct ways in which state action may
interfere with that religion’s beliefs or practices.”159 Failing to do so, in his view,
156. For a thorough discussion of the dialectics of symbolic meaning and ritual in the context
of religious formation, see especially Asad, supra note 100, ch 1. For an extensive and
illuminating study of the function of symbolic meaning in relation to the Christian religious
experience, see CJC Pickstock, “Te Ritual Birth of Sense” (2013) 162 Telos 29; Louis-Marie
Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian Existence,
translated by Patrick Madigan, SJ & Madeline Beaumont (Te Liturgical Press, 1995). Tis
dynamic in religion is also refected in the law. For a discussion of this in relation to legal
language and interpretation, see Roderick A Macdonald & Jason MacLean, “No Toilets in
Park” (2005) 50 McGill LJ 721.
157. For two cogent articulations of the intersection between the philosophical and legal theories
in this regard, see Ronald Dworkin, Religion Without God (Harvard University Press, 2013);
Laborde, supra note 9. See also Rafael Domingo, “Te Dworkinian Religion of Value” (2014)
29 JL & Religion 526 (commenting on Dworkin’s theory of religion and its connection to
religious freedom jurisprudence).
158. Ktunaxa Nation SCC, supra note 24 at para 130.
159. Ibid at para 128.
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excludes non-Western religious experiences from the protection ofered under
section 2(a) of the Charter. In particular, Indigenous religions, with their
unique attachments to land, will have no place in constitutional protections for
religious freedom.160
Although Justice Moldaver’s argument shifted from focusing solely on the
subject to also include the object of religious belief, it still neglected another
crucial element of law’s apprehension of religion as a legal fction: the process by
which the law’s apprehension of religion involves an interplay between legal and
religious forms of meaning. Tis can be seen in his reference to the Amselem dicta
that “it is the religious or spiritual essence of an action” that attracts protection
under 2(a).161 Focusing on religious “essence” posits a new focal point for religious
protection. It is no doubt a step forward to see religion as something more than
the beliefs of individuals, as also including cultural and symbolic attachments.
However, objectifying religion as some sort of cultural phenomenon that has to
be apprehended and protected in its own unique terms actually reinforces the
problem identifed with the majority decision. Te majority saw religious freedom
as a formal protection for subjective pursuit of belief, whereas Justice Moldaver
saw religious freedom as a substantive protection for a more robust sociological
phenomenon that includes rituals and practices alongside beliefs. Both apprehend
religious meaning in static terms, and both portray this conception of religion as
somehow natural to the religious element protected in the Charter.
Te static view of religion afects not only the way that religion is
conceptualized but also the way that law is able to engage with religion in reasoning
towards a solution to the confict.162 Tis can be seen in two key points that did
not factor into the Court’s analysis of Ktunaxa as signifcantly as one might have
expected. First is the fact that the Ktunaxa religious claim was raised extremely
late in the consultation process.163 Second is the fact that the development site
in the Qat’muk was previously developed and used for mining.164 Te questions
that these facts raise have to do with the evolution of the Ktunaxa religion in
relation to the Qat’muk. Although the SCC majority recognized that religions
are able to evolve with time, specifcally in relation to the late revelation of the
160. Ibid at para 131.
161. Ibid at para 130, citing Amselem, supra note 3 at para 47.
162. For a similar line of argument about a fattened view of religious reasons for particular
religious actions, see Blair Major, “Translating the Confict over Trinity Western University’s
Proposed Law School” (2017) 43 Queen’s Law Journal 175.
163. Ktunaxa Nation SCC, supra note 24 at paras 6, 35-43.
164. Ktunaxa Nation SC (TD), supra note 153 at paras 19 and 280. Te Court of Appeal and
Supreme Court did not mention the mine in their reasons.
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impact that the development would have on the Ktunaxa religion,165 they did
not (and could not) engage with this evolutionary process within the parameters
they set for themselves. It is noteworthy that most of the Ktunaxa did not know
or understand that the development would expel the Grizzly Bear Spirit from
Qat’muk and destroy their religious beliefs.166 Tis is connected to the other
important point, which has to do with the previous use of the Qat’muk. Te site
of the proposed ski development was previously developed and used for mining,
and the area is regularly used for a range of activities.167 Te Ktunaxa claim did
not set out clearly why the current development and activity would destroy the
Ktunaxa religion when the previous mining development and current skiing
activity did not. Te fact that the Grizzly Bear Spirit and the Ktunaxa religion
survived both the previous mining development and the ongoing skiing activity
might indicate that they could also survive the development of the ski resort.
Introducing the ideas discussed earlier regarding legal fction would allow
the courts to engage more fully with what is at stake for religious individuals
and communities. Specifcally, the court would be attuned to the social-symbolic
process by which religious meaning is created and evolves, and how the law’s
apprehension of the religious claim is intertwined with this. Te point is not to
hold the Ktunaxa religion to an objective standard by which it reasons through
its religious claims, but rather, to be able to work the dynamism of individual and
communal religious belief with the condition of the land into the legal evaluation
of their religious claim. Instead of dismissing the Grizzly Spirit as an irrelevant
fact, perhaps it should be made the focus of the legal analysis, like the kirpan
was in the Multani decision. In other words, the Court could have treated the
Grizzly Bear spirit as a fction where law and religion meet, and their diferent
forms of meaning intersect. Of course, the Court would have to be mindful of
the lessons learned in the Multani and Bentley cases, keep its statements about the
legal fction of the Grizzly Spirit tentative, and clearly appreciate the temporary
and passing nature of the fction.
What we see instead is both the majority and minority of the Court avoiding
the challenges of the criss-cross interaction between law and religion, settling
instead for a static view of religion that is more readily assessed and managed in the
law. Te result is an assertion of the law’s concerns over and against the religious
experience of the Ktunaxa. Tis privileging of the social reality underpinning
165. Ktunaxa Nation SCC, supra note 24 at para 69.
166. Ibid at para 99. Tis is inferred by the Minister’s argument that the Late-2009
claim is “weak.”
167. Ktunaxa Nation SC (TD), supra note 153 at para 280.
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the law is precisely what the earlier discussion of legal fction warned against.
Portraying section 2(a) of the Charter as interested in and capable of accounting
for and protecting only subjective religious belief, as the majority did, nullifed
the Ktunaxa understanding of the continuity between human life and nature,
instead positing the individual as the sole source of religious meaning and agency.
Te minority decision asserted the predominance of the law’s reality more
subtly. I already mentioned that focusing on religious objects also sees religion
as a static phenomenon. Te privilege of the law’s reality comes through much
stronger later on in Justice Moldaver’s reasoning when discussing the balancing
of the minister’s statutory objectives with the Ktunaxa claim.168 Remarkably,
Justice Moldaver found that the Ktunaxa religious claim—that its religion will
be destroyed by the ski development—was outweighed by the objective of the
BC Ministry to administrate and dispose of Crown land in the public interest.169
Te reason ofered was because granting the Ktunaxa claim “would efectively
transfer the public’s control of the use of over [ffty] square kilometres of land
to the Ktunaxa,” which would “undermine the objectives of administering
Crown land and disposing of it in the public interest.”170 In other words, since
the Ktunaxa claim threatened the exclusive authority of the Minster over the
land, it jeopardized the Minister’s public interest objective. Framed in such stark
and absolute terms exposes a gap between the Ktunaxa interest and the public
interest. For Justice Moldaver, the gap cannot be crossed. Both the public interest
and the Ktunaxa claim are immovable positions. All the Court can do is make a
choice about which one to support.
Simply making a choice between public interest and the religious claim,
as two static alternatives, does not adequately address the complex relationship
between legal, religious, and other social and institutional meanings. Why could
the Ktunaxa claim not be understood as a function of public interest?171 Or,
why not see the calculus of the public interest as including the preservation of
the Ktunaxa religion? Considering these integrative possibilities would require a
frame of reference for viewing the religious claim and the ministerial objective in
terms that go beyond a static view of religious life and the sovereignty of law. Tis
is precisely what the perspective of legal fction provides.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Ktunaxa Nation SCC, supra note 24 at paras 145-55.
Justice Moldaver outlined the statutory objectives of the Ministry. See ibid at para 145.
Ibid at para 152.
See Dwight Newman, “Implications of the Ktunaxa Nation / Jumbo Valley Case for Religious
Freedom Jurisprudence” in Dwight Newman, ed, Religious Freedom and Communities
(LexisNexis, 2016) 309.
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Te Ktunaxa Nation decision reveals a failure of the Court to adequately
recognize the social-symbolic process of religious meaning formation. It also
shows a lack of judicial awareness of the privilege given to a particular conception
of reality in the evolving doctrine of religious freedom.172 It is necessary to fnd
a way to bring the law’s apprehension of religion forward to become a point of
refection and justifcation within the judicial process. I argue that the lens of
legal fction enables judicial recognition of the social and institutional processes
and related limits of the law. Such recognition does not undermine the purposes
of the law but brings the law alongside the social and institutional processes of
religion. Indeed, it may actually enhance the quality and the legitimacy of the
justifcations provided by the courts, especially in religious freedom cases. Tis
would no doubt have been true in the Ktunaxa Nation decision, which seemingly
discounted Indigenous religious claims from the constitutional protection of
religious freedom.
Legal fctions are not only about objects. Te abstract conception of religion
in law is, in itself, a legal fction. We see this clearly in the Ktuanxa decision,
where the court narrowed the scope of what is protected by religious freedom
to exclude the claim made by the Ktunaxa Indigenous claimants. A key part of
this was the distinction drawn by the court between the believing subject and
the object of their belief. Tis particular view of what constitutes “religion” for
the purposes of religious freedom is a legal fction, and there is a discernible
gap between it and the lived religious experience of the Ktunaxa people. Tis
essentialized and static view of religion has two efects. First, in clearly missing
the mark of what constitutes religious belief as a symbolic form of meaning, the
decision nullifes an important dimension of the process by which religions form
their own meaning. Secondly, the essentialized view of religion neutralizes the
fctional nature of the law’s apprehension of religion and places these elements
outside the reach of judicial discourse.
Te result is that the law’s apprehension of religion fails to capture what
is an otherwise obvious religious element to the claim. Tis negatively afects
the ability of the Ktunaxa to bring their religious claims to law, robbing them
of the opportunity to engage in legal argument regarding the purposes of law.
It also negatively afects the depth of engagement available to the law—and the
judiciary—regarding the religious claim. If the claim regarding the life of the
Grizzly Bear spirit were conceptualized as a legal fction, then the court could
actively engage with the Spirit as a legal fction, criss-crossing the legal and
172. See Natasha Bakht and Lynda Collins, “‘Te Earth is our Mother’: Freedom of Religion and
the Preservation of Indigenous Sacred Sites in Canada” (2017) 62 McGill LJ 777.
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religious systems of meaning. Tis might enable the court to develop a much
more robust analysis and response to the Ktunaxa claim, which may actually
engage the Ktunaxa people in terms that they can understand and internalize in
their own symbolic form of meaning (instead of the stilted response given by the
Court). Tis, of course, is subject to the imperative that the law’s apprehension
of the Great Bear Spirit must not negate the complex social-symbolic processes
connected to the religion of the Ktunaxa people. Instead, seeing the law’s
apprehension of the religious claim as a legal fction would enliven the court’s
interaction with the Ktunaxa and develop a clearer connection between the
religious and legal orders of meaning.

IV. CONCLUSION
Te law’s apprehension of religion cannot capture the fullness and complexity of
religious life. In this article, I argue that we are better of recognizing this fact and
incorporating it into legal analysis in a meaningful way. Te suggestion that I put
forward to this end is that the law’s apprehension of religion should be viewed
through the lens of legal fction. Doing this reframes the relationship between
law’s conception of religion and the lived experience of religious life. It shows that
the correspondence between these two is not a matter of truth or falsity but rather
a complex criss-crossing of social realities, and the collision of diferent forms of
meaning. In this way, legal fction points to a foundational aspect of human
understanding in the creation of symbolic forms of meaning. Tis, I suggest,
allows us to describe and evaluate the law’s apprehension of religion functionally,
not in terms of the specifcs of what is or is not apprehended in law, but in terms
of the process of the apprehension itself.
A key element emerging from this analysis is the idea that legal fctions—
especially the legal fctions of religion, religious beliefs, and objects—manifest the
intersection between diferent systems of meaning. Separating religion (whether
religious objects, beliefs, or other meanings) from their traditions betrays the way
in which legal fctions are necessarily embedded in the criss-cross of social realities.
Treating religion in law as an object with objectively discernible meaning rather
than as a living tradition hides the law’s role in constructing and giving meaning
to religion within the reality of law. Tis gives the impression that religion really
is as the law apprehends it. Placing the law’s apprehension of religion “above the
fray”173 like this neutralizes any discussion of it in terms of the ethical demands
173. B Berger, Law’s Religion, supra note 7 at 12.
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and the limitations of the interaction between the law and religion. In other
words, it allows the law to exert its symbolic power—via the apprehension of
religion—in total disregard of religious meaning, the social processes of meaning
formation within religion, and the intersection between religion, law, and other
social forms of meaning. Viewing the law’s apprehension of religion as legal
fction combats this tendency by exposing it and opening it to scrutiny.
Te analysis of the Ktunaxa Nation, Multani, and Bentley decisions
demonstrated, in a preliminary way, what it looks like to recast the law’s
apprehension of religion in terms of legal fction. Multani displayed how the
law’s apprehension of religion involves a complex and dynamic interweaving
of meanings together within the frame of constitutional reality. Te legal
construction of meaning is itself caught up in the process of the social
construction of meaning, which centres on the law’s encounter with other forms
of meaning (such as the religious). Ktunaxa Nation demonstrated that legal
fctions may operate at a broader level of conceptualizing religious beliefs and
are not restricted to objects of belief. Legal fctions play an important role in the
law’s apprehension of religious belief, and if utilized properly, may dramatically
expand the horizon of meaning available within the legal analysis of religious
freedom. Bentley, which started of this article’s analysis, revealed the challenge
of facing the gap in the law’s apprehension of religion. It also contains one of the
most important general lessons of legal fction: Although the law’s apprehension
of religion must be viewed in terms of the law’s purposes, not measured by the
“truthfulness” of its correspondence to lived religious experience, the law must
nevertheless apprehend religion with a healthy measure of humility and restraint.
Te courts will apprehend religion through the lens of legal reality, which
causes distortions, confusions, and challenges. But, as long as our view of the
law’s apprehension of religion is framed in terms of legal fction, these challenges
are not insurmountable. Legal fction and the attending social-symbolic process
of meaning formation provide an opportunity for a deeper and richer discussion
and analysis of the law’s apprehension of religion. It enables a description of both
the legal and the religious perspective, and it opens the door to incorporate into
legal analysis the interactive development of legal and religious meaning. Tis is
not to say that the idea of legal fction provides a complete solution, but it does
ofer a crucial step forward in the way we understand and evaluate the judicial
treatment of religion and the law’s interaction with religion more generally.

